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It is obvious from even a casual reading of the newspapers that poverty remains a
persistent concern in society. Before the question of poverty can be addressed, it is
necessary to adequately define it. Galbraith (1976) recalls that in The Devil's Dic-
tionary, Ambrose Bierce (1958) once called poverty `a file provided for the teeth of
the rats of reform'. This cynical description, while reflective of the time in which
it was written, seems neither useful nor valid today. More recently, Rose (1972)
suggested `Poverty might be said to consist of a lack of the basic necessities of life,
but the things thought to be necessary for a minimum standard of civilised life vary
widely from society to society and from age to age'. Rose's definition, while a clearer
attempt to define poverty, only presents further problems of definition, as can be
seen from his addition of an ubiquitous quote from Adam Smith (1776, p.691): `by
necessities I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary
for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent
for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without'. The aspects of the
complex and multifaceted problem of poverty which are the most concrete and there-
fore most amenable to definition (and possibly resolution) are the economic aspects.
The purpose of Chapter 4 of this dissertation is to provide an economic definition of
poverty.
Of course the term economic is meant in the `economising' sense, as expressed
most clearly by Robbins (1932): `Economics is the science which studies human
behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative
uses.' (quoted in Brown (1970)). The economic poverty line, the dividing line between
those who are poor and those who are not, must thereíore be embedded in the
theory of individual rational choice. Howevec, in order to avoid circular reasoning
5
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or tautological implications, it should not be the choice of a poor individual that
stipulates a threshold. It is a distinct difference in expenditure patterns, caused by
whether or not the resources at one's disposal are sufficient, that should originate a
definition of the poverty line. For a recent survey of other definitions of poverty, see
Hagenaars and De Vos (1988) or Callan and Nolan (1991).
Chapter 4 investigates the possibility of a poverty concept within a microeconomic
model of utility maximization. The assumption of an S-shaped instantaneous utility
function in a life time allocation problem creates such possibility. The poverty concept
that emanates from the solution of this problem, is tested for its empirica,l validity.
For this purpose, an empirica.l specification of an S-shaped utility function is needed.
And in addition, some gauge or benchmark as a point of reference for a poverty line
is required to implement the test for empirical validity.
Chapter 2 introduces the particular utility function that will be employed in the
empirical part of Chapter 4, the Welfare Function of Income (WFI). This WFI is
measured through the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ). The IEQ asks a respondent
of a survey to associate income levels with six evaluative verbal labels from `very
bad' to `very good'. The parameters determining an individual WFI are estimated in
the so-called IEQ regression. Additionally, Chapter 2 examines various assumptions
underlying this regression. Also, the extent of the measurement errors in the WFI
parameters caused by the regression is indicated.
Chapter 3 introduces the specific concept of poverty with which the poverty line
of Chapter 4 will be compared. This specific concept is based on the so-called Min-
imum Income Question. The line between those who are poor and those who are
not, is drawn at the income level, below which a household eventually finds it is not
able to make ends meet. This chapter proceeds with a problem raised by the use of
subjective information on incomes. Respondents, i.e. heads of households, appear
to misperceive their own household income and variables related to income. If the
questionnaire provides separate information on both perceived total income and in-
come components, it is possible to correct for the underestimation in the income and
related variables. Chapter 3 deals with the estimation of the appropriate extent of
adjustment to the answers to the Minimum Income Question.
Issues less touched upon in the poverty literature are the aspects of behaviour with re-
spect to earnings. In estimating poverty line models, the individual's income is almost
De. J.H. ZooN
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always assumed to be exogenous. This is a questionable assumption. For instance,
Murray (1984), evaluating President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty , concluded
that U.S. social policy itself induced many of the poor to remain poor. `Other things
being equal' does not seem to be valid for income. Income is a decision variable in
microeconomic models of labour supply and consumption. Van Praag et al. (1982)
pointed at the possible extension of a poverty line model by including the trade-off
between income and leisure. Watts (1985) calls such an extension a clear prerequi-
site for prescriptions of income maintenance policies based on poverty line models.
Having met this requirement, one is able to evaluate an income (re)distribution or
a social security system with a social welfare function while taking account of both
individual welfare and labour supply.
Chapter 5 opens with an exogeneity test for income in the poverty line model
introduced in Chapter 3. Next, both the consumption and earnings aspects of income
are considered simultaneously by incorporating the poverty line model in a labour
supply model. In that way, this study continues to embed a poverty line within a
specification resulting from utility maximization.
The way labour supply is modelled in Chapter 5 is very simple and follows the
standard neoclassical labour supply model, which is not always as realistic. Chapter 6
extends a neoclassical labour supply model with, however, no regard to a poverty line.
A neoclassical labour supply model is fitted to the data by endogenising wage rates
and introducing restrictions from the demand side of the market in the choice set of
the individual.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a synoptic conclusion.
F.L. VAN ~T HUL-NOORDHOORN
Chapter 2
The Income Evaluation Question
The following sections deal with data generated by the so-called Income Evaluation
Question (IEQ). Section 2.1 introduces the Welfare Function of Income (WFI), that
will be employed in the empirical part to the life time allocation problem of Chap-
ter 4. This WFI is measured by posing the IEQ. Section 2.1 explains how one's WFI
can be determined from one's answers to the IEQ. One assumption in the measure-
ment procedure pertains to the quantification of the verbal stimuli contained in the
IEQ. This is ca,lled the equal quantile assumption and it is examined in Section 2.2.
Section 2.3 considers the distributional assumptions underlying the IEQ regression.
Finally, Section 2.4 indicates the extent of the measurement errors in the parameters
obtained through the IEQ regression.
2.1 The Welfare ~nction of Income
The Welfare Function of Income (WFI) was introduced by Van Praag (1968). In Van
Praag (1971), the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) was developed to measure the
WFI of respondents to surveys. Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) and Kapteyn (1977)
elaborated the WFI concept. Essentially, it is an empirical concept and it is thereíore
appropriate to explain the WFI by describing the way it is measured.
Under the assumption that utility can be measured directly, respondents to sur-
veys are asked the IEQ to measure their welfare function of income. The IEQ runs
as follows:
9
10 CHAPTER 2. THE INCOME EVALUATION QUESTION
Which household after tax income would you, in your circumstances, con-
sider to be: Very bad? Bad? Insufficient? Sufficient? Good? Very good?







Please encircle the appropriate period. per week, month, year.
The verbal labels `very bad', `bad' etc. are identified with midpoints of six equal
intervals that partition a zero-one scale [0,1]: (2i - 1)~12, i - 1, ... , 6. This iden-
tification follows from the assumption of an optimal transfer of information by the
respondent, i.e. it is assumed that the respondent fills in the IEQ so as to make the
answers as informative as possible (for details, see Van Praag (1971) or Van Her-
waarden and Kapteyn (1981) ). At this point in the procedure, this is called the equal
interval assumption.
According to Van Praag (1968), the relation between the numerical evaluation
U(y;) on the zero-one scale and the income levels answered y; can be approximated
by a lognormal distributíon function that represents the welfare function of income:
ln y; - p
U(y;) - A(yt;l~,~) -~( a ,0,1) i- 1,...,6 (2.1)
where A and ~ are the lognormal distribution function and the normal distribution
function respectively. The location parameter p and the dispersion parameter o,
determining such a welfare function of income, are estimated for every respondent in
the following linear relation
ln ytt - he f aeu; - ~ E;i i- 1, ... , 6 t - 1, ... ,T e;t ~ N(0, T 2) (2.2)
where u; is the ((2i -1)~12)th quantile of the standard normal distribution function,
i.e. ~-1((2i - 1)~12; 0,1), and t indexes the respondent. Through the lognormality,
the midpoints of the six equal intervals have been translated into quantiles. The equal
interval assumption is now shortly called the equal quantile assumption (Hagenaars,
1986). So the equal interval assumption, (2i - 1)~12, and lognormality, ~(ln y;; p, a-),
ÍiOB lVi00NEN
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form together the equal quantile assumption, u; -~-1((2i - 1)~12;0,1). This equal
quantile assumption is examined in the subsequent section.
The whole procedure from the IEQ to a WFI is visualised in Figure 1. Figure 1
depicts a hypothetical response to the IEQ. The verbal labels `very bad', `bad' etc.
associated with the midpoints of the six equal intervals are plotted on the vertical
axis. The horizontal axis indicates the corresponding income levels of the hypothetical
response to the IEQ. Through the resulting scatter of dots, the lognormal distribution
function is fitted by employing OLS in equation (2.2). The location parameter p
fixes the income level exp(p), which is evaluated by 0.5 on the zero-one scale. The
dispersion parameter o determines the slope of one's WFI around the fixed median
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FIGURE 1: An Individual Welfare Function of Income
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2.2 The Equal Quantile Assumption
Reconsidered
The previous section set out the measurement procedure of an individual WFI with
the IEQ. One of the maintained hypotheses in this procedure is the assumption
that the evaluation question in the measurement of lognormal welfare functions of
income is answered according to equal intervals of the [0,1]-scale (see e.g. Alessie and
Kapteyn (1988) or Kapteyn et al. (1988)). This hypothesis is called the equal interval
assumption or the equal quantile assumption. In this section, the equal quantile
assumption is tested. A similar test was performed in Buyze (1982). However,
Buyze's test pertains to an earlier phrasing of the IEQ. Here, the test concerns the
current wording of the IEQ.
It will be tested whether respondents themselves associate the verbal labels, which
evoke the IEQ answers, with equal intervals on a numerical scale. To that end, the
quantiles u; in equation (2.2) will be estimated jointly with the individual parameters
p.t and ~~. Estimation will only be possible after the imposition of some identifying
restrictions on the vector u-[ul, ..., us]T. These restrictions will be chosen such
that comparison of the estimation results with the equal quantile case is possible.
Before turning to estimation, some attention is paid to Van der Sar et al. (1988),
who also checked whether the equal quantile assumption is acceptable. Initially,
they assume perfect fit in equation (2.2) and allow the quantiles to vary over the
individuals: ln y;i -~: ~-atu;t. Then the vector u is restricted such that the parameters
~t and vi are computed as the sample mean and the sample standard deviation of
the logarithms of the IEQ responses per respondent respectively: The restrictions
~; u;s - 0 and ~; u2t - 1~5 give pt - 6~~ lny,e and vt - 5~;(ln y;s -!~s)~.
Subsequently a vector ui is calculated for every respondent, of which the average,
~~ ui~T, is used as estimator for the vector u. This different procedure however,
hinders assessing the effect of the equal quantile assumption in equation (2.2). Van
der Sar et al. postulate a statistical model different from (2.2) and consequently
another estimator for at emerges. Van Praag (1991) recognises this difference, but
also finds that both estimators yield very similar results for his data set. In Van
Praag (1991), the equal interval assumption is tested and it is not rejected. The test
was, however, related to a five-label question. In the estimation below, the model
and the restrictions are such that the estimator for ot is the same function of u, either
estimated or fixed by the equal quantile assumption.
NIEK EN R.IA VAN HASSELT
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2.2.1 Estimation of the quantiles
Estimation of the parameters pt and v~ has always been subject to the equal quantile
assumption in equation (2.2),
In y;t -~e -~ atut f Eit 2 - 1, ..., Ó t- 1, ..., T E;t ~ ÍVlO, T~)
The quantiles u; have been fixed at 4'-1((2i - 1)~12;0,1). This assumption is tested
by estimating the quantiles u; jointly with the parameters p~ and oi. To allow for
estimation, two identifying restrictions are needed, since in equation ( 2.2) {~i, Qi and
u; imply the same values of lny;t as ~i f (~Qe~~3) , aQ~ and ( l~a)u; -( 1~,Q), with ~
and Q arbitrary constants.
First, restrict ~; u; to zero. This restriction implies the following LS-estimator
for pt
~t - ~ ln y;t~6 (2.3)
~
Note that this estimator for pt also follows under the equal quantile assumption.
Second, set a norm for the vector u and choose vt to be positive. The parameters
ot and u; can now be estimated.
To keep the results comparable with the equal quantile case, the norm of u is
chosen to be equal to the norm of u under the equal quantile assumption. This is
denoted as ~~u~~ - ~~u~~~.
The LS-estimate for u is found by minimising
z 2
~ ~ ~TJ~te - u; ~ uiyie~ ~, u~~ - ~ I ~ yé - I ~ u~y~t~ ~ ~ u?~ (2.4)
s ~ i i e`t `; ~
subject to us - ~~u~~~~ -~5I u?, and where y;t - lny;t - jtt. See Appendix 2.A for
a derivation of this result.
2.2.2 Data and estimation results
The data are from the October 1985 wave of the Social Economic Panel survey
conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Out of a total of 3064,
information is used on the 3026 respondents who completely answered the IEQ.
The estimation results are shown in Table I. The estimated quantiles differ signif-
icantly from the quantiles under the equal quantile assumption. This is in contrast
FAM. H. }iENDRICKX-VERREEK
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TABLE I: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Equal ~(u~;; 0,1) Estimated 4i(u;; 0,1)
quantiles quantiles
-1.38 0.08 -1.17 (0.003) 0.12
-0.67 0.25 -0.76 (0.003) 0.22
-0.21 0.42 -0.40 (0.003) 0.34
0.21 0.58 0.15 (0.003) 0.56
0.67 0.75 0.73 (0.003) 0.77
1.38 0.92 1.45 (0.003) 0.93
standard errors in parentheses
IIu~II2 - 4.79, T - 3026
with the results reported in Buyze (1982). In Buyze (1982), all the estimated quan-
tiles u; are within a standard error from those under the equal interval assumption.
But the variances reported in Buyze (1982) arouse suspicionl (see Appendix 2.A).
However, it is more interesting to see how the estimation results for the quantiles
influence the measurement of the WFI's. As mentioned before, if ~; u; is restricted
to zero, the estimates of pt are not affected by the equal quantile assumption. The
comparison of the results for at in the equal vs. estimated quantiles case can be
summarised as follows
b~r - 0.292 s;~, - 0.123
vt - 0.294 s;, - 0.125
á, - Q~, - 0.002(0.0001) s;,-~~, - 0.006
where the overlining indicates sample means, s denotes sample standard deviations
and the suffix e refers to the equal quantile assumption; the standard deviation in
parentheses is the sample standard deviation s;,-ó~, divided by the square root of the
iThe data set used by Buyze is no longer available so, unfortunately, replication is impossible.
However, the first aim was to test the equal quantile assumption for the current phrasing of the
IEQ.
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number of observations. Although the average difference is significant, it is remark-
ably small. So the parameters at seem on average hardly affected.
2.2.3 Conclusions
The equal quantile hypothesis identifies the parameters at of the individual welfare
functions; the parameter ~tt is identified by the less restrictive assumption ~; u; - 0.
Under the assumption of the lognormal shape of the welfare function of income,
the equal interval assumption implies that ~; u; - 0. Measurement of the individ-
ual welfare function of income has always been carried out under the equal interval
assumption. Possibly, rejection of the equal quantile hypothesis could explain the
common result of the Leyden program (Hartog, 1988) that the explanation of v in
contrast with p has been less successful. However, although rejection does occur, the
results do not seem to affect o very much. The joint hypothesis of the lognormal
shape of the welfare function of income and equal intervals still provides a reasonable
approximation to data generated by the IEQ.
2.3 Truncation in the IEQ Regression
Section 2.2 paid attention to the equal quantile assumption in the IEQ regression.
This section considers the IEQ regression again. Attention is paid to the assumption
in equation (2.2) that E;t ~ N(0, r2).
The IEQ answers appear to be ordered. This means that the assumption E;t ~
N(0, r~) cannot be entirely correct. From the ordering of the answers, it follows that
ln y:t -~ yt-it - Qt(u; - ui-1) -~ E;t - E;-lt i 0
Since
i - 2,...,6 (2.5)
E[E;t ~ Eit - Ei-lt ~ - trt(ui - uj-1), 2 G j C i] ~ 0 i - 2, ..., 6 (2.6)
the assumption, in particular that the expectation of the errors equals zero, is vi-
olated. Denote, just for convenience, Eit - Ej-1t, and ui - ui-~ as DEit, and Dui
respectively. The following equations2 express the violation.




ZSee Appendix 2.B for a derivation.
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E~E3t I DE~ i-Ott~Ug, DE~t i -UtOtLy~ -
rztP(-at0u3) fornu, ~P(~E2t I DE3t --at0u3)dOEZt 2.8
I~ f~ ~(~E3ti~Eqt)I~DEyt(~~E3t ( )orAu3 orAuy
E~E1t I DEqt J - t7tOTLq, ~E3t 1-Ot~tLg, ~E2t J -[1t~Uq~ -
ao 0o
QE2t ~Eqt - -Ut01Lq I~DEyt(j0E3tT2~(-tTtOuq) f orAu3 fvrAuy ~(~E3t~ I
J~ f~ J~ (P(DE DE DE )t~~E t~~E tIDEor~us or~u3 or0uz 4tr 3tr 2t Yt 3t qt
where cp represents the various appropriate normal density functions.
Similarly, a fivefold integral will be found in the expression for the conditional
expectation of Est. Implementing this in estimation will be costly in computer time.
Moreover, with r being small, the violation will not be that severe. Using ót - 0.29
and the average sum of squared errors Ti - 0.008 from the SEP Oct85 data for at
and r2 respectively gives the following result for the equations (2.7-9):
F.~E~t I DEZt i -Ot0742~ - 0.007
E~E3t I ~Egt i-Qt~TLg, DEyt i-OtOuy~ - 0.018
E~Eqt I DEqt 1-Qt~iLq, s~E~ i-Ot~113i DEyt ~-QtOUZ~ - 0.020
Though these numbers indeed seem small, a simulation with the model cannot repli-
cate the data: If lny;t -~t f vtu; f E;t are generated by drawing E;t from N(O,Tt ),
then in 875 cases out of 3026, ln y;t is not increasing in i. So this matter should be
pursued, but here it will be left for future research.
2.4 Measurement Error in ~c and ~
The measurement of the parameters It and o that determine the individual WFI's,
through the IEQ regression obviously entails measurement error. This measurement
error can be summarised by the average covariance matrix for j~t and ïtt in the IEQ
regression:
-1
LT~ iTU 0.001 0Y
T -
aTU uTU 0 0.002
(2.10)
DR. P. VAN HASSELT, VREDEN DLD.
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When ~ and v are used as regressors, an errors in variables problem arises. For
example, if one tries to link a poverty line, an income level to distinguish the poor
from the afHuent, with the parameters of the WFI in order to assess the welfare level
going with that particular poverty line. Let the poverty lines enter the vector y and
fill the X-matrix with the vectors ~c and v in
y-XQfe (2.11)
The OLS estimator for ~ is inconsistent and the asymptotic bias is given by
plim (i - ~ - -plim (TXTX)-1f2,Q (2.12)
where S2 is the covariance matrix of the measurement errors in X(see e.g. Johnston,
1960).
If the average covariance matrix from equation ( 2.10) is inserted in (TXTX)-1SÈ
for SZ, the bias can be assessed. For the SEP Oct85 data, the following result is found
foI (TXTX)-1SZ :
-TT2 I ~T ~t pT a l -1 ~Ta
tTU 1 0.000 0.003
I ~TQ QT~ J ~ ~T,u uTU ] - - [ -0.003 -0.109 ]
(2.13)
The bias in the parameter estimate with respect to v, say p2i will be prevailing and
will be towards zero. If one finds a parameter estimate with respect to ~, say Ql, in
the neighbourhood of one and wants to read off the welfare level ~(Q2i 0,1), belonging
to the poverty line linked with the WFI, one should note that this welfare level will
be biased towards 0.5.
2.A Appendix
Equation ( 2.2) reads in more tractable notation
vecY-{~~cs-bQ~ufE E ~ N(O,T~16T) (2.14)
where Y is a 6 x T matrix with columns [ln yli, ..., ln ysi]T, F~ -[I~1, ..., I~T]T , cs -
[l, . . . ,1]T, Q - [vl, . . . , QT]T and u - [ui, . . . , us]T. Imposition of the first identifying
restriction ~; u; - 0 by premultiplying equation (2.14) by IT ~ Es yields
vecEsY - Q~ u f~ rl ti 1V(0, r21T ~ Es) (2.15)
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where Es - I6 - sr,scs takes deviations from column means. After defining Y- EsY
and substituting the first order condition for ~, Q- YT u~uT u, in
(vecY - Q ~ u)T(vecY - o ~ u) - (vecY)TVecY - 2uT YQ -~ ~TQUTU (2.16)
the LS-estimate for u is found by minimising
(vecY)TVecY - uTYYTU~uTU (2.17)
As is known from Rayleigh's Principle, the second term attains its maximum for u
collinear to the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of YYT . Laffar-
gue (1977) shows that this procedure will provide a consistent estimator for u for
T-a oo, if p ~ N(0, r~IgT). However, it can easily be derived that the estimator for
u remains consistent in case n~ N(0, r~IT ~ E6) :
Denote the true parameter with a subscript o. Assume that limTy~ T~t ~ó: -~ó~
Then TuTYYT u~ uT(Qóuouó f r'Es)u. And uT(ó;u,uó f r2Es)u~uTU has a unique
maximum at u- auo,.~ E R`{0}. Therefore, the LS-estimator is consistent.
In Buyze (1982), the standard errors for u come from the formula T~(áTQ)-116i
that can be seen as the covariance matrix for u applying OLS in equation (2.15) with
Q fixed and erroneously assuming that p~ N(0, r~IsT). This formula may underes-
timate or overestimate true variances. In any case, it overestimates with respect to
the correct formula for the covariance matrix for u applying OLS in equation (2.15)
with à fixed: TZ(vTV)-'Es. This matrix has the appropriate rank to account for the
restriction ~; u; - 0 and is used for the standard errors for u as printed in Table I.
Further, she reports the following inconsistent results varvi - T2~uTU - 0.012,
while var~i - T2 - 0.007 and uTU - 4.541. Possibly, this inconsistency in report-
ing drives the difference in the results for T~(óTQ)-1, 0.15(Buyze) vs. 0.003(here),
underlying the standard errors of the estimated quantiles.
2.B Appendix
For equation (2.7), define (see also Johnson and Kotz (1972)):
E~ESi ~ ~e~i ~-viDuz~ - E~vi ~ vs 1 cz~ - E~vi ~ ez~ (2.18)
where
[v2~ ~N~[oJ~[ ~v~~ ~v~ ~)
2.B. APPENDIX
and
~ t7~vv1 OOvl , - [ T~ 2T~ ~
Note that
E[v~ ~ ox1- E[EIv~ ~ v~l ~ ez1- E[~"'v'vz~~~
and
Pr(6z)E[us ~ Os] - Q~~P(c~)
where
Pr(62) - f~ cp(vz)dvz
~
So
Pr(Oz)E~vi ~ es~ - Q~1,n~P(c~)
For equation (2.8), define (see also Johnson and Kotz (1972)):






























~v3 ~(C3) fcz ~(v2 I C3)dv2
where
~ ~
Pr (e~3) - f I ~`U2, tJ3 )dvzdv3~3 ~z
SO
Pr(ez3)E~vl I e 23~ - Qv~v~3
f ~1CY) fc~ ~(v3 I
C2)dZ'3 1
IL ~(C3) fcz ~(v2 I C3)dv2 J
For equation (2.9), define:
ELE4t I DEq~ J-Q~Otlq, DEg~ ~-OtOTL3i DEy~ ~-U~~iLy) -








rz rz 0 0 ~
rz 2rz -rz 0
0 -T~ 2T~ -T~





E~v~ I e234 I - E(E(vi ~ vz, vs, va) ~ ezs4) - E Q,,,~3. ~V734 va ~ ezaa (2.27)
v~
and calculations give
vz iP(cz) f~,o f~, ~P(vs, v4 ~ cz)dv3dv,
Pr(0zs4)E vs ~ ~zs4 - E~3. ~P(cs)fti f~ ~P(uz,v4 ~ ca)duzdv4










~(C2) Jc~ fc~ ~(U3, V4 I Cz)dv3dv4
PI(~234)E~vl I ~234~ - Qvivxa~ ~(~3) fc~ fci ~(v2, v4 I C3)dvzdv,
~(C4) fe~ fcs ~lvz, v3 I C4)dvzdv3
(2.29)
These results can be generalised for higher order truncation (see Pudney (1989)):
Elvl I Oz...pl - ElElvl I vz...pJ I ~z...pJ - Ov1vx...n~in1..yE lvz...p I ~z...pl (2.30)
where
vz
Pr(0z...p)E [vz...p ~ ~z...P~ - f~ . . . f~ : ~P(vz, . . . , vP)dvz . . . dvPcv cz
Note that
8~P(v2, . . . , v ) -p -~,~1 D VZ...p~(v2, . . . , VP)
8vz...p
and thus
vz: -... . ~ v2,...,VP Ly... vpf~ 1~ep cy
~ ~
I~ . . . tca ~(OZ, v3, . . . , llp dv3 . . . dvpP
`VJ...p .
( 'W r ao





Pr(Oz...p)E~vI ~ Oz...P] -~~v,v~4~(~) fe-,
~P(v-~ ~ c;)dv-~ (2.33)
t-z
where the subscript - i denotes the exclusion of the ith element from {2, ..., p}.
vP
vP
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Chapter 3
The Minimum Income Question
This chapter deals with a particular poverty line that stems from a survey question,
the Minimum Income Question. This poverty line will be used in the empirical part
of Chapter 4 in trying to validate empirically the poverty line that emanates from
the solution of the life time allocation problem in that chapter.
Section 3.1 presents the so-called Minimum Income Question (MIQ) and intro-
duces the Subjective Poverty Line that springs from the MIQ. A crucial variable in
the Subjective Poverty Line (SPL) model is household after tax income. Section 3.2
considers several adjustment procedures in the SPL model to take account of mani-
fested misperception of household income. Section 3.3 contains the estimation results
for the various SPL models and Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 The Subjective Poverty Line
The Subjective Poverty Line (SPL) was introduced in Goedhart et al. (1977). It
is called `Subjective' because it is based on the respondents' answers to a survey
question, the Minimum Income Question (MIQ). Callan and Nolan (1991) classified
the SPL under the `Consensual Income Poverty Lines', as the SPL is based on views
in the population about minimum income needs. The MIQ tries to measure these
views. It runs as follows:
Which after tax income for your household do you, in your circumstances,
consider to be absolutely minimal? That is to say that with less you could
not make ends meet.
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The MIQ answer, given by the head of household n, is referred to as the respondent's
minimum income ym;,,,,,.
The SPL is operationalised by specifying a relation between ym;,,,,, on the one
hand and household income and a vector of household characteristics on the other
hand. In the following section, the adjustment for the misperception of household
income is discussed on the basis of a method as advocated by Kapteyn et al. (1988).
Consequently, in order to facilitate comparison of the estimation results in section
3.3, the SPL equation will initially be specified as in Kapteyn et al. (1988):
ln ym~n,n - ao -f- a:l(1 - ct2)fG~ f~(1 - a2)f~ ln yn f~s 1n yn
~-(1 - C~2)m„ - al(1 - a2)hc„ - zG(1 - ~2)hc„m„ ~ E„ (3.1)
where
fc„ composition of household n
y„ household after tax income
m„ mean In income in the reference group of household n
hc„ mean household composition in the reference group of household n
En error term
Household composition is specified such that both the number of persons in the
household and their ages are taken into account:
fan
f~ - 1 f lnfs„ -t- f(ai) f ~Í~(ai)ln(7~(7 - 1));-z
where
fs„ number of persons in household n
f(ai) - 0 a~ ~ 18
f(ai) - 72(18 - a~)2 .}- ry3(18 - a~)2(36 -~ ai) 0 C a~ C 18
where a~ refers to the age of person j and ry2 and ry3 are parameters to be estimated.
From equation (3.1), y,,,;,,,,, can be written as a function of y,,, for given values
of the other variables on the RHS, as set out in Figure 2. The MIQ answers are
aggregated into the SPL by the following reasoning. Suppose one obtains an income
to the right of ym;,, in Figure 2. Take the corresponding minimum income level and




FIGURE 2: The Subjective Poverty Line ymin
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return it as income. Through an iterated habituation process that person will end
up in the fixed point of the function set out in Figure 2. The SPL is defined by this
fixed point of that function, y;,,;,,,,,, which equals
ex ao
f ai(1 - cr2)Í~ f (1 - a2)mn - al(1 - az)hc,, -~(1 - a2)hc„m„ 3.3
p (1 - a2)(1 - ~f~)
( )
The income level ym;,, is the point where a household can just make ends meet.
Eventually, a household with less income is not able to manage and a household with
more income is able to manage. Having estimated the parameters in equation (3.1),
the SPL can be evaluated for various household compositions.
3.2 Adjusting for pownward Bias
In the definition of the SPL, the respondent's income appears to be a crucial variable.
So it is important to know which estimate of his own household income the respondent
has in mind when answering the MIQ. If the respondent underestimates this income,
it is likely that he will also underestimate ym;,,,,,. Empirical evidence indicates that
respondents indeed misperceive their own household after tax income (see Kapteyn et
LOUIS EN ÀNNIE
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al. (1988)). R,espondents appear to underestimate their household after tax income.
This underestimation turns out to have a downwards biasing effect on the subjective
poverty line in empirical implementation. Walker (1987) also pointed out that the
concept of income the respondent has in mind may not always be the same as the
researcher's.
In Kapteyn et al. (1988), a method was presented to remedy this bias. One
can adjust the responses to subjective questions if these questions are preceded by
a question which measures the respondent's perception of his household after tax
income. The misperception of income can be calculated from a comparison of the
respondent's perception of the income with the measurement of income as the sum
of a lengthy list of components. Next, the responses to the subjective questions can
be corrected. An alternative is of course to avoid the misperception, by prefacing the
subjective questions with the detailed questions about household income components.
Here, the focus is on the former case.
Kapteyn et al. (1988) assume that the answers to the subjective questions are
biased in the same proportion as income is underestimated by the respondent. This
section presents the adjustment procedure as proposed in Kapteyn et al. (1988) and
indicates how their assumption can be empirically relaxed. An alternative assump-
tion is also given through a more direct use of the measurement of the respondent's
perceptíon of income in explaining subjective answers.
A factor of misperception can be calculated from comparison between the respon-
dent's estimate of income and a more accurate measurement of income. Just before
the MIQ in the survey, the respondent's perception of his household after tax income
is measured by the following question where the respondent can choose out of seven
income brackets:
Can you indicate roughly what the total after tax income of your house-
hold has been during the past 12 months? Less than Dfl. 17, 500; 17, 500-
20,000; 20,000 - 24,000; 24,000 - 28,000; 28,000 - 34,000; 34,000 -
43,000; 43,000 or more.
Table II reflects the underestimation of household income.
In order to analyze the systematic difference in Table II between the results from
the two income measures, Kapteyn et al. postulate the following relation between
income y;,, the answer to the income question in brackets, and the income components
y,,; (i - 1, . ..,1) recorded at the end of the questionnaire
LITTLE AND BIG MAMBO
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TABLE II: COMPARISON OF TWO INCOME MEASURES
Income Bracket Average Income N6
Reported
c 17,500 17,201 564
17,500 - 20,000 25,085 355
20,000 - 24,000 28,690 521
24,000 - 28,000 32,128 632
28,000 - 34,000 38,305 635
34,000 - 43,000 45,412 686
~ 43,000 65,006 698
Dfl. per year. The aecond column gives the average income of
all households in the correaponding income bracket according to
the detailed measurement of income. N6 heads the number of
respondents in the income bracket. SEP Oct86.
I
. q n,.
yn - ~ Niyni e
i-1
where the ~3;'s are parameters to be estimated and t)n is a normally distributed error
term with mean zero and variance o~. The values of parameters p; are expected to
lie in the unit interval [0,1]. The smaller a parameter Q;, the more the respondents
`forget' the ith income component when answering the income question in brackets.
The parameters ~3; and v~ can be estimated by means of maximum líkelihood.
Denote the factor of underestimation by gn. The parameters ,~; being estimated,
this factor can be evaluated as gn -~;1 yn;~ ~;1 Q;yn;. Kapteyn et al. now assume
that the respondent underestimates his minimum income ymin,n by the same propor-
tion as his current income yn. It is however not entirely obvious why the adjustment
of ym;n should be proportionate to the underestimation of y, for in equation (3.1) y,n;n
and y are not linearly related. Moreover it appears that the extent to which ymin
should be corrected, can be estimatedl. Let in gn enter equation (3.1) as an extra
1This was suggested by a referee of Kapteyn et al. (1988).
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- -óingn f ~o f ~~(1 - ~2)fG~ f ~(1 - ~2)fcnlnyn f a~~yn
f(1 - ~2)mn - ~1(1 - as)hcn - ~i(1 - as)hcmm~ f en (3.5)
The parameter ó indicates the extent of adjustment. Substituting the adjusted value
y,,,;n,n9n for y,,,;n,n in equation (3.1) yields equation (3.5). Note that it is possible to
test whether proportional adjustment is appropriate, i.e. ó- 1 vs. ó~ 1.
From equation (3.1) an alternative specification readily suggests itself. In the
response to the MIQ, income serves as a frame of reference. This is represented by
In yn in equation (3.1). However, ln y;, seems a more natural candidate to capture
this frame of reference, or perhaps a combination of ln yn and ln y;, is best. So the
alternative specification to equation (3.5) reads
ln ymin,n - ao f al(1 - a2)fcn f(~(1 - a2)fc„ f as)((1 -.1)lnyn f~lnyn)
-F(1 - ~Z )mn - 0!1(1 - Qs)jLCn - 1,1(1 - ~s)ÍLCmm~ ~ en (3.6)
The equations (3.5) and ( 3.6) are identical if in gn - ln yn - ln y;, and ó- a(tli(1 -
~Z) fc„-{-az). For equation (3.5), ln ym;n,nfó in gn is substituted for ln y,n;n,n in equation
(3.1) and for equation (3.6), ln yn in equation ( 3.1) is replaced by (1- ~) ln yn~A ln y;,.
In estimation, equation ( 3.6) results in particular, but nonnested cases of equation
(3.5). The concurrences in specification are tabulated in terms of ó and ~ in Table
III.
TABLE III: CONCURRING SPECIFICATIONS
D a
0 0
~(~(1 - ~2)fCn ~ aZ) ~
~i(1 - a2)fc„ f a~ 1
ê -
1 -
In the next section, the estimation results are given for all specifications. Assum-
ing that en and r~n are independent and follow a normal distribution the parameters
are estimated by maximising the loglikelihood
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L-~ ~ln Pn - 21n(a? f b'on) - 2 0~ fb~o~)
where
s
lnub in ~ p - ~~ `Pn - ~ n - ~.i-1 Niyni o~2} ]onSn
v~a~~ Q~ f ó~o~
hl Ibn - ln ~i1 Yiyni - 09~ 7o7Sn
-~
?~O,I, Oi ~ ÓO~
where ~n - e„ ~- bnn, ~ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and
ubn and (b„ are respectively the upper and lower bound of the income bracket y; is
part of.
3.3 Estimation Results
The data are from the October 1986 wave of the Social Economic Panel survey
conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Table IV lists the income
components distinguished, yni-
TABLE 1V: INCOME COMPONENTS
Head of household's wages, salaries, benefits
Head of household's fringe benefits
Rent subsidies
Household allowances
Profits, employer's contribution to health insurance premiums, scholarships
Head of household's other income
Spouse's income
Eldest child's income
Other household members' income
Table V presents the estimation results for equations (3.4) and (3.5). The esti-
mated parameters Q; indicate that the head of household's wages etc. appear to be
PERS- óL PUBLICITEITSFOTOGRAFIE TUMMERS
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TABLE V: ESTIMATION RESULTS EQUATIONS (3.4), (3.5) AND (3.6)
b 0 a(~i(1 - a~)fc„ f az) 0.40(0.02) 1






-0.43(0.03) -0.38(0.01) -0.39(0.01) -0.38(0.01) -0.30(0.01)
3.88(0.78) -0.12(0.25) -0.13(0.25) 0.48(0.32) -2.00(0.21)
0.54(0.04) 0.34(0.03) 0.35(0.03) 0.39(0.03) 0.29(0.04)
0.05(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01)
-1~10-3 -1~10-3 -1~10-3 -1~10-3 -1~10-3
(3~10-') (2~10-') (3~10-') (3~10-') (2~10-')
-0.35(0.07) 0.03(0.02) 0.03(0.02) -0.03(0.03) 0.21(0.02)
o.sl(o.ol) o.sl(o.ol) 0.90(0.01) o.so(o.ol) o.so(o.ol)
0.95(0.07) 0.77(0.06) 0.78(0.06) 0.79(0.06) 0.84(0.04)
0.39(0.08) 0.42(0.08) 0.41(0.08) 0.42(0.08) 0.63(0.08)
0.44(0.07) 0.79(0.07) 0.79(0.07) 0.78(0.07) 0.75(0.06)
0.73(0.02) 0.68(0.02) 0.68(0.02) 0.68(0.02) 0.69(0.02)
0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.48(0.03)
0.87(0.02) 0.90(0.02) 0.90(0.02) 0.90(0.02) 0.86(0.02)
0.43(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.41(0.03)
0.48(0.04) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.04)
Q~ 0.31(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.31(0.004)
Q,, 0.29(0.004) 0.30(0.004) 0.30(0.004) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.004)
L -3543.6 -3312.2 -3315.3 -3312.5 -3803.0
N- 4091, standard errors in pazentheses.
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recalled almost completely. Components, like incomes of children and other household
members, rent subsidies and head of household's other income are often forgotten.
Clearly, the hypothesis ó- 1 has to be rejected. A striking result is that ó- 0
in the first column performs even better than ë- 1 in the fifth column in terms
of the likelihoods. In the fourth column, an estimated value of 0.40 is found for Á
significantly different from zero and one. The estimation result .~ ~ 1 in the second
column is difficult to interpret. At a high significance level (Xi;o.oi - 6.63) however,
the restriction .~ - 1 in the third column holds, which signifies that only income as
perceived by the head of the household, y;,, is the frame of reference when completing
the survey.
To compare the results between the columns in Table V, Figure 3 presents the five
corresponding age functions f(age) and Table VI exhibits the implied poverty lines for
various household compositions. The poverty lines have been computed with m„ and
hs„ set equal to their sample means. Except for ê- 0, the age functions look rather
TABLE VI: POVERTY LINES
Household Composition b- 0 ~-~ .~ - 1 ó - ó b- 1 Statutory
Poverty
Line
1 Adult 14,239 15,310 15,181 15,091 15,489 13,218
2 Adults 18,095 17,415 17,091 17,537 16,387 18,882
2 Adults f 6 18,298 18,359 18,017 18,564 16,832 19,963
2 Adults f 12 19,100 18,481 18,070 18,702 16,942 20,233
2 Adults f 12,6 19,240 19,199 18,772 19,462 17,337 22,071
2 Adults f 12,6,1 20,575 20,430 19,969 20,788 18,158 23,360
2 Adults f 12,6,2,1 21,222 21,290 20,811 21,681 18,834 24,933
2 Adults f 18,12,6,1 21,996 21,335 20,742 21,723 19,000 28,281
Dfl. per year.
similar. Although the age functions show a dip, the poverty lines in Table VI rise
whenever the number of persons in a household increases. Household size in number
of persons compensates the age dips below zero. For ó- 1, i.e. overadjustment of
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ln y,,,~n,,, according to Table V, the poverty line for a one-person household appears
to be overestímated with respect to b unrestricted. Similarly, the economies of scale
are overestimated in this case.
Just for comparison the last column of Table VI contains the levels of the statu-
tory poverty line for the selected household compositions. The levels are based on the
Social Assistance Act and include holiday and family allowances. The steeper house-
hold composition compensation of the statutory poverty line does offset the lower
starting level of a one-person household. No matter the specification, the statutory
poverty-line levels end up higher than the subjective poverty-line levels for all selected
household compositions, except for the first one.
3.4 Conclusion
If, in a questionnaire, the MIQ is not preceded by detailed questions on household
income, to avoid misperception of this income by the head of the household when
answering the MIQ, the answer should be corrected. Prefacing the MIQ with a
measure of the perception of household income enables adjustment in explaining the
answer to the MIQ. If one prefers to adjust the answers, it is possible to estimate
the appropriate size of adjustment. Also the measurement of perceived income may
be used more directly in explaining the MIQ answers. Both approaches show, that
adjustment proportionate to income misperception leads to both an overestimation
of the Subjective Poverty Line, for a one-person household, and an overestimation of
the economies of scale if there is an increasing number of household members.
CORNELUS A. VpN 'T HUL
Chapter 4
An Economic Definition of
Poverty
To the author's knowledge, the first use of the term `an economic definition of poverty'
is by Watts (1968). Watts mainly uses the adjective `economic' to distinguish the
economic from the cultural concept and to exclude from consideration sociological,
political, psychological, and physical ills associated with poverty. He indicates the
limited possibilities of links between a concept of poverty and basic economic theory.
After making a sharp distinction, between resources on the one hand and preferences
on the other, he concludes, that economic poverty is associated solely with `severe
constriction of the choice set' and adds two features that recommend a definition
based on the choice constraint: it avoids imposing a norm on tastes and values, and
no measure of satisfaction is required. But Watts does not resolve which poverty line
should correspond with `severe constriction'. The line between poverty and affluence
still has to be defined. It is to this end that preferences enter.
An indirect utility function that suggests a natural poverty concept, is the indirect
utility function underlying the AID (almost ideal demand) system of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980). Similar to Gorman polar form utility functions (Gorman, 1976), a
part of the specification can be interpreted as subsistence expenditure. Consideration
of this is deferred to Chapter 5.
Recently, Lewis and Ulph (1988) proposed to ground the measurement of poverty
in individual rational choice. `If all commodities were perfectly divisible, and yielded
direct consumption benefits captured by a utility function that was differentiable,
strictly increasing, strictly concave and identical for all consumers, then as we com-
pared the expenditure patterns of consumers on different incomes, we would see these
35
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varying in a continuous fashion. [...] Within such a framework there is nothing in
the consumption behaviour of the consumers nor in the construction of the indi-
vidual welfare functions that gives one particular level of income the characteristics
and significance that the poverty line has in the poverty literature.' Thus realising
that being poor is distinctly different from being affluent, and that this is associated
with distinct changes in consumer behaviour and, possibly, utility, they embody a
discontinuity in the indirect utility function.
In the next section, it is the assumed S-shape of the utility function that buttresses
the distinct changes in the individual consumption pattern. The poverty line is
defined in a life cycle framework. Section 4.2 compares this poverty line empirically
with other poverty lines that have been suggested within an S-shaped utility function
context. Section 4.3 elaborates the comparison in a redistribution context.
4.1 The Model
In this section, which draws heavily upon Wansbeek (1976), a poverty line is defined in
a life cycle framework. By assuming an S-shape for the utility function, the solution
of a standard life time discounted utility maximization problem yields a positive
minimum level of expenditure, which identifies a poverty threshold.
The consumer's allocation problem over time can be stated as follows
m~ fT a(t)U(c(t))dt
subject to








The instantaneous utility function U of the consumption level at time t, c(t), is
assumed to be an S-shaped utility function as shown in Figure 4, with U(0) - 0;
x(t) are the consumer's capital holdings. The time preference function is denoted by
a(t), and is greater than or equal to the discount factor going with the market rate of
interest p. The initial end point, x(0), is fixed at B, representing the consumer's initial
capital endowment, which includes discounted future income, but excludes planned
MnR.to 8z Kcnus
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bequests. The terminal end point x(T) is fixed at zero, where the open final time T
is the planning horizon, to be determined by the outcome of the model.
Since time t appears explicitly through the discount function a(t) in (4.1), the
pmblem described is a nonautonomous optimal control problem with final time open
and fixed end points (Takayama (1974), p. 613). Necessary conditions in order for
x'(t) and c'(t) to be a solution to the maximization problem are
aH' aH'
(i) i - ~, ~i - - axi
where
H(x(t), c(t), t,w(t)) - woa(t)u(c(t)) -~ w,(t)(Px(t) - ~(t))
and
H' - H(x'(t),c'(t),t,w(t))
(ii) H' ? H(x'(t), c(t), t, w(t)) ~dc(t) ~ 0
(iii) H(x'(T),c'(T),T,w(T)) - 0
(iv) wo ~ 0
where w(t) -(wo,w~(t)) is a nonzero vector-valued continuous function. Condition




wl(t) - ryexP(-Pt) (4.6)
where ry is a constant of integration. The solution c`(t) now follows from (ii) by
maximising the Hamiltonian H with respect to c(t) at time t. The first order condition
for an interior maximum of H is
woa(t)U'(c(t)) - ryexp(-pt) - 0 (4.7)
The parameter wa cannot be zero, because equation (4.7) would then imply wl (t) - 0,
which is at variance with the requirement that the vector w(t) be nonzero. Since ry
is an arbitrary constant of integration, wo can be set equal to one without loss of
generality. This carries (4.7) over into
GERDA EN HUMPHREY
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U~(c(t)) - ryeXp(-pt)a(t)
The parameter ry has not yet been determined here. This will be dealt with below.





where U' is the maximum value of U', with associated consumption level c. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
To satisfy the second order condition for an interior maximum
s
~c~)z - a(t)U"(c(t)) G 0 (4.10)
the consumption level should exceed e, as can be inferred from Figure 4. If the
first and second order conditions for an interior maximum are satisfied, it has to be
checked whether the maximum exceeds the boundary value of H, i.e. H evaluated in
c(t) - 0. For the interior maximum to exceed the boundary value of H, the following
must hold
a(t)u(c(t)) fW,(t)(p2(t) - c(t)) ? a(t)v(o) fW,(t)px(t)
or
a(t)U(c(t)) - c.rl(t)c(t)) ~ 0
or, using (4.7)
U(c(t)) ) U'(c(t))c(t) (4.11)
This condition states that average utility must exceed marginal utility. In Figure 4
that will be the case for any consumption level in excess of c. Obviously, condition
(4.11) implies condition ( 4.10), so that the latter condition can be ignored.
The optimal behaviour of the system through time now becomes apparent. When-
ever inequality (4.9) or ( 4.11) is not satisfied, the c(t) which maximises H lies on the
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FIGURE 4: The shape of the utility function -, the marginal utility function --,
and the average utilíty function --.
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-{t ~ 0 G t G oo I~ yexP(-Pt) ~ U , ~ U(~(t)) ~ U~(~(t))}- a(t) - c(t) - (4.12)
(4.13)ro - ~~i~) `T}
where c(t) is the solution of (4.7). Then
c'(t) ~ e, t E r~ (4.14)
c'(t) - 0, t E ro (4.15)
It remains to determine the value of the planning horizon. Since x(T) - 0, condition
(iii) implies
a(T)U(c(T)) f7exp(-pT)(-c(T)) - 0 (4.16)
Equation ( 4.16) has two solutions. The first one is c(T) - 0. The second one is
obtained by using ( 4.7) to write
U(c(T)) - ryexp(-pT) -
U'(c(T)) (4.17)
c(T) a(T)
which implies c(T) - c. The first solution does not determine T uniquely, as one can
maintain a consumption level equal to zero forever. The second solution determines T
as the final period in which consumption is positive. In the final period, consumption
is equal to c. This value of T is adopted as the length of the planning horizon, since
the first solution has no interesting economic interpretation. Finally, note that ry and
T are determined jointly by (4.17) and the condition
`TJ c(t)exp(-pt)dt - B
0
(4.18)
From (4.14) and (4.15) a consumer will either be seen to consume at a rate which
exceeds a certain positive minimum or not to consume at all. This minimum c can be
construed as an economic poverty line, since the optimal consumption path does not
contain any point from the interval (0, è). This distinct change in optimal consumer
behaviour suggests è as being an economic poverty line.
In the next section, the subjective responses of participants in surveys to the
Minimum Income Question are compared with the characteristics of the instantaneous
S-shaped utility function, elicited from the same respondents by means of direct
questioning, the Welfare Function of Income.
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4.2 Empirical Validity
A well-known S-shaped utility function, associated with relative and sub jective poverty
lines, is the individual Welfare Function of Income (WFI), introduced in Chapter 2.
Corresponding poverty line models have been estimated in a spate of papers. See
Hartog (1988) for a review and critical evaluation of this research.
Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985) suggested a link between the Subjective Poverty
Line (SPL) model and the Leyden Poverty Line (LPL) model and asked for further
investigation. The LPL is based on the individual WFI. This WFI is measured by
asking the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ). The SPL is based on the Minimum
Income Question (MIQ). The suggestion by Kapteyn and Wansbeek amounts to an
equivalence between the income corresponding to the inflection point of the S-shaped
utility function and the SPL. At the point of inflection, the utility function turns from
increasing marginal utility into decreasing marginal utility, representing the threshold
between deprivation and gratification (Miller, 1988).
Another argument comes from a theory of preference formation (Kapteyn, 1977),
which states that an individual's WFI is identical to his Perceived Income Distribution
(PID). This amounts to the concurrence of the inflection point with the modal value
of the PID. So someone is (feels) poor, if his income is below the level, which is of the
most frequent occurrence to him. Although Desai and Shah (1988) regard poverty as
a multidimensional phenomenon, they allude to relative deprivation as the difference
between the actual experience and the norm, where the norm is defined as the modal
experience in the community. This is in line with the conjecture above.
However, as seen in the previous section, in the case of an S-shaped utility func-
tion, the solution of a standard life time discounted utility maximization problem
dces not yield a threshold where marginal utility reaches its maximum value. The
threshold emerges, where average utility reaches its maximum. The availability of
the empirical concepts, the WFI and ym;,,, enables an empirical comparison of the
various poverty lines.
The conjecture mentioned above, that the poverty line could be defined by the
point at which the WFI turns from convexity to concavity increasing, can now be
expressed by
zln ymin - ~ - a (4.19)
where exp(p - 02) - c is the mode of the PID. This conjecture is compared with
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the line c that follows from the equality in (4.11). When the WFI is used as utility
function, the rival expression becomes
1n ymin - {~ ~ f (a) (4.20)
where f( v) is a nonlinear function of a following from the solution for c from
A e. Q- 1 ex
1 ln c-~ ~
( , f~, ) Q 2~r p- 2 a
The comparison will now simply be a look at correlation coef~icients R between on
the one hand ln y,,,;n -~e and on the other -Q~ and f(o).
The data are from the October 1985 wave of the Social Economic Panel (SEP)
survey conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The data
set contains 2948 observations. Table VII gives the sample means and standard
deviations of the various variables.
TABLE VII: DATA SUMMARY
ln ymin
s~-Q
l~ f f (o)














The line p-}- f(Q) is too high on average in comparison with ln ym;n, whereas the
line ~ - 02 is near ln y,,,;n.
Table VIII indicates how these variables correlate. Both ~e f f( o) and p-v2 appear
to correlate with ln y,,,;n, but it is ~e that drives the correlation. If the different parts,
-Q~ and f( Q), are singled out, only -a~ correlates with In y,,,;n - ~, despite the
correlation between -a~ and f (Q).
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TnsLE VIII: R's ~N (4.19) nNn (4.20)
l~ -~~ l~ f f(~) l~
ln ym~n 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.02 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.13)




Prob(R ~~tabulated value~ ~ R- 0) in pazentheses.
So if ln y,,,;,, is chosen as a benchmark, the comparison above gives more empirical
support for the poverty line that resulted from a threshold in the utility function than
for the poverty line that resulted from a threshold in consumption. The lines com-
pared differ however only as function of o, which suffers severely from measurement
error (see Chapter 2). One should keep this in mind but also that the result depends
on the gauge chosen, when measuring the respective empirical supports. The follow-
ing section compares the functional forms of both poverty lines and their feasibility
at income redistribution.
4.3 Feasibility
This section compares several properties of the rival poverty lines emanated from
the previous section. The functional forms are looked at and two schemes of income
redistribution are considered. First, the redistribution is effected by reducing o under
an invariable shape of the income distribution. Second, the redistribution comes
about by taxing the incomes above the poverty line level such that the incomes
below the poverty line level are pulled up to the poverty line level.
Figure 5 presents the different functions, -02 and f(v). As concluded before from
Table VIII, the functions differ, certainly in the neighbourhood of the sample mean,
á - 0.29.
Suppose that through full transparency oí the society everyone's PID equals the
STICHTING E.D.P. PIJNACKER
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FIGURE 5: -o~ - - , ,f(o) -.
income distribution and thus the individual WFI parameters all equal the income
distribution parameters p, Q respectively. Let inequality be reflected by o. Assume
that the shape of the income distribution is ímmutable under redistribution and
thus keeps its lognormal shape. Inequality diminishes when o decreases. Average
income, exp(p f zo2), is kept constant at exp(10), so with o le varies in the following
way Ic - 10 - 2Q~. Figure 6 describes the paths of é- exp(10 - l~o~) and é-
exp(10 - Zv' f j(a)) for o- 0 to v - oo, and Figure 7 gives the corresponding
welfare levels, A(c; p, o) and A(é; Ic, Q). Welfare ~(In é; ~, ~) -~(-o; 0,1) does not
exceed 0.5, whereas welfare ~(]n c; p, o) - N( f( o)~Q; 0,1) does, and in a particular
manner: For values of o below 0.35 welfare still increases, while é decreases. Welfare
increases through diminishing inequality expressed in o, despite the decrease in c.
This is a remarkable result. In case of a modal experience reasoning (Desai and
Shah, 1988) underlying the poverty line as for c, this result can only be attained
if the income distribution is skewed to the left, which is uncommon for an income
distribution.
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FIGURE 6: e - exp(10 - 12a~) --, c- exp(10 - 2a2 ~ f(o)) -.
45
Now consider the second scheme of redistribution. Incomes y above the poverty
line level pl are taxed at a rate ~9 for the part above pl : ~9(y - pl). Incomes below pl
are raised to pl. In formula:
~n`(pl - y)y~P(]ny;l~,~)dy - ~ f~(y -PI)y~P(]ny;l~,a)dy
So
Using
Pl~ ~~~a~ - .lo~ ~P(ln y; f~, o)dy
pl (~ (~~~) - 1) f f,ï ~(]n y; {~, ~)dy
1 ~ 1 (lny-p~21
~D`'P(]ny; F~, a)dy -~y' v 2a eXP - 2 I` a ll dy
~
exP(p f 2v~)~




yields for ~9 :






FIGURE 7: A(c; ~, Q) --, A(c; P,, o) -.
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I~d-u ~ s 1~y~-N-ozp1~ ( o )- exP(p f sa )~ o
~ - pl (~ (~~e) - 1) - exp(l~ f z~~) ~~ ~~D~;-o~) - 1)
(4.24)
Feasibility of this redistribution restricts ~9 to the interval [0,1] and so ln pl C p f zo~.
é- exp(p - Q~) satisfies the condition for all values of Q; c- exp(p ~- f( Q)) satisfies
the condition for values of Q greater than 0.6135, which seems rather restrictive.
4.4 Conclusion
With the idea that it should be possible to relate economics with the identification
problem in poverty measurement, i.e, setting a poverty line, this chapter attempted to
derive a poverty line in a utility maximising context. The assumption of an S-shaped
utility function in a life cycle model (which is standard, except for this assumption)
indeed reveals what could be recognised as an economic poverty line. However, em-
ploying the Welfare Function of Income as utility function and y,,,;,, as gauge for a
poverty line did not result in empirical support for the economic poverty line. While
adopting the income distribution as utility function, the feasibility of redistribution
to eradicate poverty turned also out to be restricted. But, as Sen (1983) puts it,
`the fact that elimination of some specific deprivation -even of starvation- might be
seen, given particular circumstances, as ínfeasible, does not change the fact of that
deprivation. Inescapable poverty is still poverty.'
So on the one hand, an economic poverty line has been established, but on the
other, the empirical analysis did not succeed. Future research requires other specifica-
tions for an S-shaped utility function and~or an other point of reference for minimum
income.
Chapter 5
Spending and Earning Income
So far the household has been looked upon as a spending unit. Its command over
income was considered regardless of the sources of income. The possible interplay of
earnings and income transfers, however, necessitates some account of the behavioural
attributes of the household as an earning unit. Income transfers might affect the
trade-off between consumption and leisure demand. People might be more greedy on
income (transfers) if it does not require labour supply.
With this in mind, Section 5.1 questions the exogeneity of income in the Subjective
Poverty Line (SPL) model and similarly, Section 5.2 attempts to integrate the SPL
model in a labour supply model.
5.1 Exogeneity of Income
A possible drawback in the determination of poverty lines in general lies in the as-
sumption of exogeneity of income. In microeconomic models of labour supply and
consumption, income is traded off against leisure time. The choice variable income
enters the SPL model as an exogeneously determined variable. This section considers
the exogeneity of income in the SPL model. The most simple specification for the
SPL model from Chapter 3 is adopted:
ln ymin.n - ao ~ CY1(1 - az)Ï~ -~ ~(1 - ct2)Í~~ ln yn f a21n yn
~(1 - a-2)m„ - al(1 - a2)h~ - ~(1 - az )hCmm~ f E n (5.1)
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where
fc„ composition of household n
y„ household after tax income
m„ mean ln income in the reference group of household n
hc„ mean household composition in the reference group of household n
En error term
Household composition is specified as
f~~ ('
fCn - 1~ lnf3n ~ f(al) ~~ J(a7) ln(~~(~ - 1))
~-z
where
fs„ number of persons in household n
f(ai) - 0 a~ ~ 18
.Í~(ai) - 7z(18 - a~)z ~ y3(18 - a~)z(36 f ai) 0 G a~ G 18
where a~ refers to the age of person j and ryz and 73 are parameters to be estimated.
In order to test for exogeneity of income, more precisely ln y, an equation describ-
ing lny is supplemented to equation (5.1):
1ny-X~-~v (5.3)
Now, the hypothesis cov(E,,, v„) - v~„ - 0, equivalent to the exogeneity assump-
tion, is to be tested. The complete error covariance matrix of the recursive model
(5.1) and (5.3) is
r l r l T r z l
E I E J I E J - E~ IN - I~` a`v J ~ IN (5.4)L v Lv L w
If o~~ - 0, E is diagonal and equation system (5.1) and (5.3) is called a simple
recursive system (Fomby et al., 1984).
If e-[E v]T is a normal random vector, the probability density function of e is
(2~)-" ~ ~~ 1~ ~-~ eXP(-2eT(~-' ~ IN)e) (5.5)
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Note that for a change of variables from e to z-[ln y,,,;n ln y]T, the Jacobian of the
transformation is unity. For that purpose, suppose just for notational ease that every
household is in every other household's social reference group. Thus mn in equation
(5.1) equals 1'N ~r~n ]n y,. and
dz-f Ilv
BJde IL 0 IN
where B denotes the matrix












~ay-1 1-~~hcN ay-1 1-~hc~.
N-1 -1
ay-1 1-~hc~y
1 ~(~2 - 1)j~N - ~2
Then the loglikelihood function of N observations can be written as
L - --ln(vfv~ - aev) - - ~ [En vn] f ~` ~`V
En
2 2 nNl L ~2 U~ ] [ Vn
N
--N ln(Q~O~ - O~V) - 2 21 2 L~( 1 EnaV - E n vnacV } 1 VnQc )2 0~ v~ - v~V n-i 2 2
and the LM-test statistic for testing a~,, - 0 is
LM - ~aL1T (B)Z-,(B)aL(e) - aL (e)~o~~(B) aL(B) ~ Xi (5.8)áe J ae a~~ ~ a~~ ~
N 2z 2 1
-1
where
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ÓÍ~ (B) - ~n Enyn
ÓO~y O~Ov
and where B represents all parameters and tildes indicate estimators under the null.
In Engle (1982), a test has been derived to test the hypothesis whether a recursive
system is a simple one when the likelihood has the form as in (5.7) and therefore has
a score as in (5.8). This test eliminates the need to construct the information matrix
of the full parameter set. The test statistic is simply calculated as N times R~ of the
regression of é on G and "v, where G is the matrix of derivatives of the right-hand
side of equation (5.1) with respect to the parameters in this equation evaluated at
the estimates under the null. Estimates assuming the null hypothesis to be true are
denoted by ". The residuals é and 'v in equations (5.1) and (5.3) are obtained using
nonlinear least squares and least squares respectively.
Table 1X gives the estimation results of the parameters in equations (5.1) and
(5.3) under the null using SEP data (Oct86, N-2406).
The regression of É on G and "v
é--0.01 f 1.36(1-~z)(fc-hc) f 0.21(~rl(hc-fc)-~i(fclny
(0.01) (0.24) (0.04)
-hcm) f ln y - m) -F 4.43(1 - ~2)((~1 -~ ~i ln y)~ - (tzlf
(2.36)




yields an RZ of 0.02 and with N-2406 this results in a test statistic of 45.71, which is
in excess of Xi;o.os - 3.84. Clearly, the null hypothesis has to be rejected decisively.
This rejection of the exogeneity of income in the SPL model gives a lead to embed
]n ym;n in a choice model. The following section attempts to integrate the SPL model
in a labour supply model.
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N- 2406. Aasuming normal errors, the loglikelihood is 3008.5. With a view to Section 5.2, the
data only contain workers.
5.2 Labour Supply and ln y„t2n in the AID System
As alluded to in Chapter 4, subsistence expenditures are well recognised in the Almost
Ideal Demand (AID) system (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). This provides an
opportunity to include ln ym;,, in a labour supply model.
5.2.1 The model
Starting point of the analysis is the cost function underlying the AID system:
ARNO TUMMERS
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c(u, w) - exp(a(w) f ub(w)) (5.10)
where
1




ao, a~, ryi, bo, b~ parameters
At the introduction of the AID system by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), the term
a(w) in the cost function was regarded as the cost of subsistence or poverty expen-
diture. This induces the attempt to connect ln yn,;n with a(w). It seems unnatural
to let ln w and In2 w from a(w) enter the ln ym;n equation (5.1). As the cost function
should remain homogeneous of degree one in prices, ln w and ln~ w have to enter the
cost function. If one allows the wage terms to enter the cost function indirectly, by
including ln w and ln2 w in the ]n y,,,;n equation and one does not distinguish between
the terms in the ln ym;n equation, then ln y inappropriately enters the cost function.
So the most simple connection between a(w) and ln ym;n is equating aa to ln ymin
and keeping ln w and ln2 w separate in a(w) and the cost function. Additionally, this
connection solves the identification problem of ao, which often occurs in practice (see
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).
By the property of the cost function known as Shephard's Lemma, Hicksian de-
mand functions are found as the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect
to prices. See Deaton and Muellbauer (1983) fot a very perspicuous exposition of
utility, cost functions and demand. Marshallian demands are found by solving u
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and substituting the solution for u in the Hicksian demand function. Proceeding in
this way and using the complementarity of labour supply to leisure demand, h - T-l,




ao - ln ymin
v error term
To account for the effect of misperception of household income, the SPL equation
is specified as in Chapter 3:
lnymtin,n - -ëingn -f ao f al(1 - az).Ícn f~(1 - c~z)Ícn ln yn ~- cYZ ]nyn





yn - ~LNiyni l exP(On)
.-i l
(5.14)
The model to be estimated now consists of four equations: (5.12), (5.13), (5.14) and
(5.3). Equation (5.3) for ln y can be seen as a reduced form equation. It is kept in
the model, for the endogenous variable In y is in equation (5.13). Assuming that r~ is
independent of the other errors and all errors follow a normal distribution,i vzn000 ~z .~ zPtacw wP2~cw P3ww ~2 Jv (5.15)
the loglikelihood can be written as (note that the Jacobian equals one)
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li -~ In Pn - 2 ln I~I - Z~Cn Vn vn~~-' Vn
n-1
where
P - ~ (In ubn - ln ~~ ~ Q;yn; - ~nltvvl
Qq~(ilvvn l J
-~ (ln Ibn - lII ~i-1 Ni yn; - i~nlCyv~l Q7~~(Vv
~ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function
ubn is the upperbound of y;,
lbn is the lowerbound of y;,
pnlCvv - banE-i
~nlCv„ - o~ - b'o~~E~-'(v~ov - Qvv)





The data set used for estimation is the October 1986 wave of the SEP. Before turning
to the estimation results, some comments on the estimation procedure are in order.
No information on potential wage rates of nonworkers is available, and therefore the
workers are selected for estimation. In estimation, a selection rule should account for
the sample selectivity. To that end, the following term is added to the loglikelihood
vn
N
- ~(1 - ~(trn~w)) (5.17)
n-1
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TABLE X: ESTIMATION RESULTS EQUATIONS (5.13), (5.3) AND (5.12)
(5.13) (5.13),(5.3)8z(5.12) (5.13),(5.3)8e(5.12)
Pz-O, Pa-O
(5.13) ó 0.44 (0.03) 0.44 (0.03) 0.43 (0.03)
tro -0.41 (0.01) -0.44 (0.01) -0.43 (0.01)
~~ 0.06 (0.31) 3.60 (2.00) 0.97 (1.14)
á.2 0.44 (0.05) 0.85 (0.05) 0.71 (0.08)
'ry2 0.03 (0.02) 0.14 (0.44) 0.45 (0.21)
"rya -0.001(0.0004) -0.004(0.001) -0.001(0.0005)
,~i 0.02 (0.05) -0.52 (0.30) -0.10 (0.16)
(5.3) ~ro 5.56 (0.09) 6.45 (0.04)
~rl -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01)
~r2 0.04 (0.005) 0.001(0.002)
~ra o.ls (0.02) o.ol (o.ol)
~r4 0.26 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
o.2s (0.02) -0.20 (o.ol)
0.11 (0.01) 0.30 (0.004)
-o.ol (o.ol) -0.02 (0.005)
112 112
á~ 0.27 (0.004) 0.29 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01)
Q~ 0.36 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01)
Q„ 14.31 (0.22) 17.14 (0.31)
pl -0.37 (0.04) -0.30 (0.04)
p2 0 -0.22 (0.04)
pa 0 0.94 (0.003)
L -1296.6 -7514.5 -5401.8
N- 2406, standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE XI: ESTIMATION RESULTS EQUATION (5.14)
Jointly with (5.13) (5.13)8a(5.3) (5.13),(5.3)át(5.12)
Q, 0.95(0.01) 0.95(0.01) 0.95(0.01)
Q2 0.72(0.07) 0.73(0.08) 0.74(0.08)
Q3 0.22(0.09) 0.21(0.09) 0.21(0.09)
~, 0.31(0.07) 0.30(0.07) 0.31(0.07)
QS 0.11(0.04) 0.11(0.05) 0.10(0.04)
ps 0.20(0.04) 0.20(0.04) 0.19(0.04)
p, 0.73(0.02) 0.73(0.02) 0.73(0.02)
~38 0.21(0.04) 0.20(0.04) 0.20(0.04)
~ 0.23(0.06) 0.24(0.06) 0.24(0.06)
á„ 0.21(0.004) 0.21(0.004) 0.21(0.004)
N- 2406,standard errors in parentheses.
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FIGURE 8: Age Functions, -- complete sample, pl - pz - p3 - 0, eqns. (5.13) and
(5.14); -- workers only, pl - p2 - p3 - 0, eqns. (5.13) and (5.14); -- workers
only, p2 - p3 - 0, eqns. (5.13), (5.14) and (5.3); - workers only, eqns. (5.13),
(5.14), (5.3) and (5.12).
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TABLE XII: POVERTY LINES
Household Composition Complete Workers Workers Workers Statutory
Sample, Only, Only, Only, Poverty
(5.13)8z (5.13)8t (5.13), (5.13), Line
(5.14) (5.14) (5.14)8L (5.14),
(5.3) (5.3)óc
(5.12)
1 Adult 15,091 14,403 5,089 7,331 13,218
2 Adults 17,537 15,953 7,921 9,595 18,882
2 Adults f 6 18,564 16,916 5,470 10,207 19,963
2 Adults -}. 12 18,702 16,771 7,230 10,471 20,233
2 Adults ~ 12,6 19,462 17,490 5,492 10,923 22,071
2 Adults -{- 12,6,1 20,788 18,756 6,731 12,238 23,360
2 Adults -}- 12,6,2,1 21,681 19,654 6,845 13,038 24,933
2 Adults ~ 18,12,6,1 21,723 19,232 8,750 13,221 28,281
Dfl. per yeaz.
where
tr„ -(a~ -~ 7~ ln w„ ~ b~ ln(v„ -~ wnT) -
b~(ao f ai ln w„ f 27i ln2 wn)) vn ,~wnT - T
n
In estimation, the parameter T is fixed at 112 hours a week. Fixing the parameter T
is not uncommon for an AID labour supply function (see e.g. Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1986)). Estimation of T jointly with the other parameters did not succeed, because
T tended to infinity.
The presentation of the estimation results has been divided over two tables. Table
X presents the estimation results for equations (5.13), (5.3) and (5.12). The first col-
umn gives the estimation results for equation (5.13). In the second column, equation
(5.3) has been added to account for the endogeneity of ln y in equation (5.13). The
third column presents the estimation results for the complete model. The results
for equation (5.14) are in Table XI. The third column of Table X appears to be a
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significant improvement over the second. The estimate íor 6~ suggests that ln ymin
enters the labour supply model significantly. The negative value signifies that leisure
is a necessity.
As in Chapter 3, the estimation results are compared on the basis of the implied
poverty line levels. The poverty line levels based on the results are converted to
an annual basis. Figure 8 presents the age functions for several specifica.tions and
Table XII shows the poverty line levels for various household compositions. The first
and last column are copied from Chapter 3. Only the third age function, where only
the income equation has been added to the ln ym;n equation, causes some implausible
effects by its rather deep dip. At several places in the third column of Table XII,
the poverty line falls when the number of persons in a household increases. Bringing
in labour supply (see the fourth column) redeems these household size effects, but
still brings about a severe fall in the poverty line levels. One would expect some
decrease of the poverty line levels in a labour supply context, but not that profound.
Naturally, these numbers should be considered with proper reserves, for they depend
on the way labour supply has been modelled and the specification chosen.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, account is taken of the endogeneity of income in the SPL model.
Moreover, the SPL model is estimated in a labour supply context. For the latter,
the specification of the AID system is employed. This approach seems successful,
but generates a drop in the poverty line levels beyond expectation. The way labour
supply has been modelled is still very simple and is not always as realistic. The
results certainly require further research. The next chapter focusses on only labour
supply and indicates how a simple labour supply model can be extended.
S 8c K rt.nt.
Chapter 6
A Simultaneous Wage and Labour
Supply Model with Hours
Restrictions
It is well known that the simulated distribution of working hours in a standard
neoclassical labour supply model often very poorly fits the actual data on hours.
This chapter intends to tackle this problem by amending the standard model in two
ways. A model is constructed which is fundamentally based on Moffitt (1984), who
made the budget constraint nonlinear by introducing hours dependent wages, and on
Dickens and Lundberg ( 1985), who dealt with hours restrictions.
One reason for the bad fit of the hours distribution could be the invalid assump-
tion of a fixed wage rate. Moffitt, among others, extended the standard neoclassical
labour supply model by making the wage rate endogenous and found significant ef-
fects of hours of work on the wage rate, leading to an S-shaped budget constraint.
This supported the hypothesis put forward by Barzel ( 1973), that the marginal pro-
ductivity ( and thus the marginal wage rate) eventually declines at a higher number
of working hours. Rosen ( 1976) argued that the wage rate might depend on the
number of working hours, due to the fact that there exist different markets for jobs
with varying numbers of hours. There is no reason that the market for full-time jobs
will clear at the same wage rate as the market for part-time jobs. Especially in The
Netherlands, where there is a growing interest in part time jobs, mainly by women,
this might be an important consideration. Another reason for making the net wage
rate dependent on hours of work is the progressive tax system.
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Although the model with hours dependent wages fitted the hours distribution
better than the standard Tobit model (Moffitt, 1984), the assumption of fixed wage
rates does not seem to be the only invalid assumption. Another doubtful assumption
in the standard model is that individuals can freely choose the number of hours they
prefer to work. If the diversity of the offered hour packages is large enough, if workers
have complete information about job opportunities, and if they are mobile between
jobs, they will choose the job with exactly the number of hours they prefer. If workers
aze not perfectly mobile, for example, they might not be able to work their preferred
number of hours. They will choose to work the number of hours among the available
job offers, yielding the highest utility. One of the first studies to estimate a model
with hours restrictions on micro data is a paper by Moffitt (1982). The way hours
restrictions are incorporated is largely based on a paper by Dickens and Lundberg
(1985). They present a model, in which individuals may face constraints on their
number of working hours. Their model is set up as a discrete choice model, in which
each worker ca.n choose from a limited number of job offers, with fixed numbers of
hours. They assume, however, that the wage rate is fixed. The model in this chapter
incorporates both hours restrictions and hours dependent wages. Taking into account
the availability of jobs, with different numbers of hours and hours dependent wages,
is a first step in modelling both the supply side and the demand side of the labour
market.
Section 6.1 presents the model with both hours restrictions and hours dependent
wages. Hours restrictions are incorporated by assuming that employers offer jobs with
a fixed number of hours. Workers face the market distribution of these employment
opportunities. An individual chooses the number of hours corresponding with the job
among those available that yields the highest utility. Notice that the individual is still
a utility maximising person, although he maximises utility on a subset of all possible
numbers of hours. This subset can be empty, because the number of job offers is a
random variable of which zero is one of the possible outcomes. Consequently, the
model distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Wages are
made endogenous by specifying a wage equation in which the wage rate depends on
hours of work and squared hours of work. Section 6.2 presents estimation results for
females and the improvement of fit, due to the various model extensions, is discussed.
Section 6.3 offers conclusions.
~{óLSN.N.
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6.1 The Model
This section first points out the way hours restrictions can be incorporated in a stan-
dard labour supply model, and second, it discusses the implications of dropping the
wage exogeneity assumption. For notational ease, subscripts referring to individuals
are omitted. In Section 6.1.1, the likelihood function is derived conditional on the
budget constraint. In Section 6.1.2, the likelihood function is formulated for the joint
wage-hours model.
6.1.1 Incorporation of hours restrictions
The starting point of the analysis is the following direct utility function ( see Hausman
(1980), Moffitt (1984)):
ln(U(h, y)) -- ln(ry - ph) - Q(h





X vector of individual characteristics such as age and family
composition
e random variable, representing unobserved tastes for work
ry, Q, ó parameters
y~0, (i~0
The restrictions ry~ 0 and Q C 0 are sufficient conditions for quasi-concavity of the
utility function and monotonicity of it in y.
Maximising the utility function (6.1) subject to a linear budget constraint yields
a linear labour supply function:
h-f~vfrywfXb~e (6.2)
TAMIRA




The wage equation is specified as
w-Ztli~bh~ch~~v
where
Z vector of individual characteristics relevant for one's productivity,
such as age and education
v error term
~i, b, c parameters
For the errors it is assumed that
LvJNN`LOJ~LPa~o~ Pae~vJl
The error term v can be interpreted as a measurement error or as unobserved wage
determining influences, such as ability.
In estimation both before-tax and after-tax wages are used for w. By using after-
tax wages we implicitly estimate the tax system in the wage equation. In other
words, the wage hours curvature may also be due to tax-related nonlinearities. When
before-tax wages are used the hours curvature is only due to nontax related factors.
See Van Soest et al. (1990) for modelling labour supply adjusting explicitly for both
income taxes and hours restrictions.
Ií b and c are equal to zero, the wage rate is fixed and we are dealing with a
linear budget constraint. Then the labour supply function given in (6.2) follows from
maximising utility function (6.1).
W.À.M. fiDAMS-TUMMERS
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When the wage equation is substituted into the budget constraint
y-whfv
a nonlinear budget constraint results:
y-hZ~fbh2fch3fvfhv (6.5)
Maximising the utility function (6.1) subject to the budget constraint (6.5) yields a
nonlinear first order condition in the form of a third order polynomial in h. Estimation
of this model would require analytical or numerical solutions to this cubic equation in
h. But, as will be explained presently, the model is reformulated as a discrete choice
problem in which utility is compared between a finite number of points of the budget
constraint (0, hl, h2, ..., h,,,). Therefore, it suffices to specify the utility function.
An individual is assumed to be restricted in his choice of working hours, due to
a lack of information or a lack of mobility. If it is assumed that employers offer jobs
with fixed numbers of hours, then the worker has to choose from a finite set of jobs,
offering fixed numbers of hours. Since working zero hours is always possible, it will
be treated as a special case. The market distribution of job offers is assumed to be
the same for all workers, such that the probability of a job offer, involving hi(~ 0)
working hours is:
Pr(job offer h- h~) - p~, e- 1, ..., m
Thus there are m different values of working hours h~ ~ 0. And there is always the
option of working zero hours. Then the labour supply decision becomes a discrete
choice out of, say, N job offers, drawn from this market distribution of offers, and
not working. If the number of job offers, N, approaches infinity, this model becomes
a model without hours restrictions (see Appendix 6.A). In that case, the worker's
behaviour can be described by a discrete choice model in which all possible values of
hours are available:
P.E.M. AnnMs
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h- h~ iff U(h„y~) ~ U(hk, yk) k- 0, ... , m and k~ j (6.7)
where U is specified by equations (6.1) and (6.5)
The index k covers the whole range of possible values of hours. However, if
individuals face a limited choice of all job offers, the index k only covers the range
of job offers received and zero. One way to model this restricted choice pmblem is
to write down all possible sets of job offers, with corresponding probabilities that an
individual will get such a set of offers. Then the probability of observing h~ hours of
work is the sum over all sets of the probability that h~ hours is preferred to all job
offers in that set, times the probability of occurence of that set. Although this way of
modelling is appealing for its conceptual simplicity, it is computationally cumbersome.
Therefore a different, equivalent approach is used. In Appendix 6.A, the two methods
are written out explicitly. The idea is that an individual is only observed to work h~
hours if he received at least one job offer h~ and if he preferred this job offer to all
the other different offers he received and to not working. The individual is observed
as a nonworker if he preferred aero hours to all job offers received.
Given the values of the two random variables e and v, it is possible to construct
a set J~ consisting of all job offers preferred strictly less than h- h~ :
J~(e, v) -{h~ : U(h~, y(h~); e, v) C U(h„y(h~); e, v), e- 1, ..., m} (6.8)
Notice once more that h - 0 is not treated as a job offer. The set J~ U{h~} contains
all possible job offers an individual could have received if h~ is observed. If this
individual would have received an offer not belonging to J~ U{h~}, he would have
preferred that offer, and he would not have been observed to work h~ hours. Define
Q~ as the probability that one draw out of the market distribution of job offers will
yield an offer that is less preferred than the h~ chosen, i.e. the offer is in the set J~:
Qi - ~ P~
heEJ~
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Then the probability of observing h- hj (hj ~ 0) if N job offers are received can be
written as:
Rj - (Qj } pl )N
- (1N if U(hj, y(hj); e, v) ~ U(0, y(0)); e, v)
(6.10)
- 0 otherwise
The first line in equation (6.10) describes the probability that the individual only
received offers that he preferred less than hj and that at least one job offer was
h- hj. This is equivalent to saying that this individual drew N times a job offer
out of Jj U{hj} (i.e. (Qj -~ p;)1`') but that he did not draw offers only out of Jj(QN).
The second line in equation (6.10) says that if hj is not preferred to zero then the
probability of observing hj is zero, since zero is always available.
The probability of observing h - 0 when N job offers are received is simply:
~-Qó (6.11)
Qó is the probability that the N job offers are less preferred than h- 0. Recall
that so far all formulas are derived conditional on the values of e and v. Removing
the conditioning on v is equivalent to taking into account the wage equation, and
formulating a joint hours-wage likelihood. This is postponed to the next subsection.
The way to remove the conditioning on the unobserved taste parameter e, is to
integrate it out. In doing so, one should remember that the probability Rj is also
conditional on the value of e. Then the likelihood of observing h- hj hours given v,
can be written as:
L(h - hj~v) - f~ ~p(e~v)Rj(e)de (6.12)~
where cp is the normal density function of e given v. It is clear that Jj, the set of job
offers less preferred than hj, is a step function in e, because only discrete values of
hours are considered. Step changes occur at e- ejk, i.e. when e takes on such a value
WILLY SPANJERS
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that working h; hours yields the same utility as working hk hours. See Appendix 6.A
for the exact formula of e;k. For values of e between e;k and e;k-1, the set J;(k)
remains the same. J;(k) is defined as J; for e;k-1 G e G e;k. Switching from integrals
to sums, (6.12) can rewritten as follows:
m
L(h - h;w) - Pr(e G e;ow)R;(U) f~ Pr(ejk-1 ~ e G e;kw)R;(k) f
k-' (6.13)
Pr(e 1 e;,,,~v)R; (rest)
where
R;(k) - Pr(h - h;~e;k-~ G e G e;k,v)
See Appendix 6.A for details on (6.13).
Until now, the number of job offers, N, is fixed. But as mentioned in the intro-
duction, in order to be able to capture the possibility of involuntary unemployment,
N is considered stochastic. The only difference with the formulas above is that ex-
pectations with respect to the number of job offers have to be evaluated:
L'(h - h;~v) - ~ L(h - h;~v, N) - p(N) (6.14)
N-0
where
L' is the likelihood when N is a random variable
L is given by equation (6.13)
Nm,r is the maximum number of job offers
p(N) is the probability of receiving N job offers.
ELLEN SEECERs
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Because L(h - Ow, N- 0) - 1(see formula (6.11)), equation ( 6.14) turns into
L'(h - Ow) - p(0) f ~ L(h - Ow, N) . p(N) (6.15)
N-t
for nonworkers. So not working is either explained by the fact that an individual did
not receive any job offers at all (p(0)) or because he preferred not working to the
offers received ( second term).
Because L(h - h;~v,N - 0) - 0(see formula ( 6.10)), equation (6.14) can be
rewritten as
L'(h - h;~v) -~ L(h - h;~v, N) . p(N) (6.16)
N-1
for workers.
6.1.2 Formulation of the joint wage-hours model
As yet the model has been derived conditional on v. The removal of this conditioning
amounts to adding the wage equation to the model and formulating the joint likeli-
hood of observing h; hours of work and the corresponding wage rate w. For workers
the joint likelihood can be defined as:
L'(h - h;,w) - L'(h - h;~v)L'(v - w- Z~i - bh; - ch~) (6.17)
The first term of this likelihood is given in equation (6.14). For nonworkers equa-
tion (6.17) has to be adapted, since for nonworkers the wage rate is not observed.
Therefore, the unobservable wage rate must be integrated out, which results in the
following:
ÍCRISTIANNE, C~iERARD, NINNE EN ÁIKE
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L~(h - fi) - P(fi) f ~(Pr(u C uoi)Ra(1) f
N-i
m
~{Pr(uok-i C u G uok)Ra(k)} -~
k-]
Pr(u ~ uo,,,)Ro(rest)] . p(N)
(6.18)
where uok - eok f ryv is the new limit of integration similar to eok (see Appendix 6.A
for further details).
With respect to identification of the model, the following comments are in order.
In the case without hours restrictions, the parameters are known to be identifiable
if the Z-vector (6.3) contains one variable not in the X-vector (6.1) (Moffitt, 1984).
Adding hours restrictions makes it much more complex. The joint sample of hourly
wages and actual hours of work is observed. This joint distribution is assumed to be
generated by the distribution of budget constraints, the distribution of preferences
and the distribution of job offers. Clearly, if no functional forms for the budget con-
straint, the utility function and the job offer distribution are assumed, one cannot
identify the parameters in the model. The main identifying assumption is that the
assumed functional form of the job offer distribution is different from the functional
form of the preferred hours distribution. Moreover the job offer distribution does not
depend on individual characteristics, while the preferred hours distribution does. Al-
though one should realise that the identifying assumptions are strong, the model still
provides a sensible, among many possible, interpretation of labour market behaviour.
The economics behind the hours restrictions model can be seen as follows. For
many individuals in The Netherlands preferred hours are lower than actual hours
worked (Kapteyn and Woittiez, 1989). Part of the explanation of this fact can be
found in mandatory overtime. But surely part of it is due to the fact that full-time
jobs are in large more available, whereas part-time jobs are relatively scarce. This
may be caused by fixed costs for the employer.
Other interpretations of the job offer distributions could be unobserved wage
variation, measurement error, fixed costs at the supply side of the labour market
or unobserved preference variation. If the latter is the explanation for the peaked
hours dístribution, then the random error term must be multinomially distributed.
ÁNITA
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But it seems reasonable to assume that unobserved preference variation is smooth
and not peaked. Fixed costs for the individual could explain the small portion of
part-time jobs, since it generates a horizontal budget constraint at low hours of work
(Moífitt, 1984). But it provides no explanation for the other spikes in the hours
distribution at 20 and 32 hours per week. Measurement error could account for the
difference between actual and preferred hours. If the estimated job offer distribution
were smooth, this might be a plausible interpretation. But a peaked distribution is
difficult to explain as measurement error. Unobserved fringe benefits that are higher
for full-time jobs than for part-time jobs could lead to less people working part-time.
But once again it cannot provide an explanation for the spikes at 20 and 32 hours
per week.
6.2 Data and Estimation Results
Most estimation results are based on the after-tax wage rate, but for the sake of
comparison some estímation results of before-tax wages are also presented. Also,
results for different values of Nmar are presented.
The data are from a labour mobility survey, conducted in The Netherlands in
1985 by order of the Organisation of Strategic Labour Market Research (OSA). Only
persons between 18 and 65 years old were interviewed. In total, the data set contains
information on 4020 individuals of whom 2325 have a paid job, 177 are self-employed,
1515 have no paid work, and three are full-time students. The self-employed, disabled
and students as well as those people for whom the information was incomplete have
been excluded. Here the focus is on females in two-adult households. As a result,
the sample contains 849 families consisting of at least a husband and wife. Sample
information is given in Table XIII. The net after-tax wage rates of employed indi-
viduals are constructed from hours worked (measured per week) and after-tax labour
income. After-tax labour income is measured by the following question:
What is the net wage in your present job, i.e. the amount you receive
without shiftwork allowance, overtime allowance, tips, travel allowance,
entertainment expenses, etc.; taxes and premiums for welfare benefits are
also excluded.
DR. MED R.A. Hecoex
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TAHLE X11I: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
hours of work per week 10.6 (15.4) 0 60
27.3~` (12.5)~` 2~` 60~`
after-tax wage rate 12.5~` (4.5)` 5.8~` 39.4~`
(guilders per hour)
before-tax wage rate 19.3~` (8.1)~` 7.4~` 60.7~`
age 37.1 (9.9) 18 61
educ2 (second level of education) 0.26 (0.44) 0 1
educ3 (third level of education) 0.38 (0.49) 0 1
educ4 (fourth level of education) 0.02 (0.14) 0 1
non-labour income (guild. per week) 714 (302) 0 2693
dummy for children younger than 6 0.26 (0.44) 0 1
family size 3.46 (1.24) 2 10
dsect (dummy for sector one is 0.29 (0.70) 0 2
educated in; social-0, econ.-2,
semi-social, semi-econ.-1)
number of observations 849
number of working females 331
Standazd deviations in parentheses. ' These numbers apply to working females only.
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Before-tax wage rates were calculated by using an approximation of the Dutch income
tax system. Nonlabour income includes rent subsidies, wealth income, rents, family
allowance, extra earnings and social benefits. For reasons of simplicity, possible
endogeneity of elements in nonlabour income is ignored.
Table XIV presents the estimation results. In approximating the budget con-
straint, the hours range has been divided into four-hours intervals. The first column
shows results for the model without hours restrictions and with a wage equation in
which the wage does not depend on hours of work. In principle, this is a standard
hours-wage model with a linear budget constraint. In the second column, results are
presented for the model in which the linearity of the budget constraint is relaxed. The
last two columns of Table XIV correspond with the model in which hours restrictions
are incorporated. Hours have been classified into eight groups with different proba-
bilities of being drawn. These probabilities are indicated in Table XIV by pl through
ps. For example, the probability of receiving a job offer of 4 hours a week equals pl.
The number of job offers N is a random variable and is assumed to follow a binomial
distribution B(pN, N,,,ar), where Nm62 has been fixed at 10. See Table XV for the
estimation results for other values of N,,,Qy.
Comparing the likelihoods of column 1 and 2, and of columns 3 and 4 in Table XIV
yields a rejection of the hypothesis, that the wage rate is independent of hours of work.
In the model with hours restrictions, the hours coefl'icients b and c are insignificant,
but their joint effect is significant, although much less so than in the model without
hours restrictions. From the estimated values for b and c, it follows that wages decline
monotonically with hours. This may be explained by the progressive tax system in
The Netherlands. Table XV presents estimation results using before-tax wages.
For the economic interpretation of the parameters other than those pertaining to
the shape of the budget line (b, c) or to hours restrictions (p's), one should bear in
mind that in the case of the nonlinear budget constraint, the labour supply equation is
a cubic equation in h. Therefore, one has to be very careful in comparing the values
of the estimated parameters in this case with the values in the linear case. From
Table XIV, one can infer that for all versions of the model, the labour supply curve
is forward bending (ry 1 0). Moreover, nonlabour income has a negative effect on
hours of work, as does family size and a dummy for the presence of children younger
than six. In the wage equation, education has a positive effect on wages and wages
increase with age until about 40 years.
Somewhat strange results are found in column 2 of Table XIV: all coefficients in
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ry (wage) 4.37 (0.85) 32.8 (52.1)
Q (income) -0.010 (0.004) -0.14 (0.23)
áa (conatant) -48.2 (19.9) 179 (223)
blo (age) -2.16 (1.49) -2.50 (10.62)
blr (age~) 0.02 (0.02) -0.06 (0.21)
bs (fam. size) -30.7 (3.6) -290 (458)
b3 (child C 6) -19.9 (2.8) -207 (328)
o~ 27.4 (2.8) 224 (348)
wage equation
(constant) -6.90 (3.03) 0.23 (3.88)
(age) 0.96 (0.18) 0.67 (0.20)
(age~) -0.01 (0.002) -0.01 (0.003)
(educ2) 0.04 (0.47) 0.24 (0.59)
(educ3) 1.57 (0.45) 2.10 (0.54)
(educ4) 4.74 (0.73) 6.04 (0.77)
(dsec) 0.39 (0.21) 0.57 (0.26)
(hours) 0 -0.004 (0.03)












3.93 (0.15) 3.92 (0.17)





2.16 (0.50) 2.61 (0.89)
-0.004(0.002) -0.008 (0.003)
37.5 (9.6) 38.5 (13.4)
-1.30 (0.72) -0.88 (0.89)
o.ol (o.ol) o.ol (o.ol)
-13.1 (2.3) -19.5 (5.5)
-7.89 (1.61) -13.4 (4.3)
11.3 (2.1) 13.3 (4.2)
-6.12 (2.87) -0.14 (3.67)
0.93 (0.17) 0.74 (0.18)
-o.ol (o.ooz) -o.ol (0.002)
0.06 (0.43) 0.09 (0.55)
1.46 (0.42) 1.91 (0.51)
4.26 (0.67) 5.61 (0.76)
0.44 (0.19) 0.59 (0.25)
0 -0.08 (0.08)
0 -0.0004 (0.001)
3.74 (0.15) 3.89 (0.16)











Standard errors in parentheses.
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the hours equation are "blown upn. This is not the case in the presence of hours
restrictions (column 4). Perhaps allowing a more flexible distribution for the error
term (which is what the hours restrictions model essentially does) generates more
stable results.
In Figures 9 and 10, the simulated hours distributions of the different versions
are compared. The solid lines are the actual hours distributions and the dotted
lines are the hours distributions simulated by the model. The model without hours
restrictions in Figure 9 does not simulate the actual hours distribution very well. This
holds both for the model with a linear budget constraint and for the model with a
nonlinear budget constraint. In both cases, the model misses the peaks at 20, 32 and
40 hours. By including more flexibility through a nonlinear budget constraint, both
the underprediction of the nonworking and the overprediction of the inviduals working
low hours are reduced. The model with hours restrictions in Figure 10 appears to
pick up all peaks. The distribution generated by these models is definitely more in
line with the actual distribution. Comparing the top and bottom figures, one can
conclude that after having incorporated hours restrictions not much improvement is
gained by making the budget constraint nonlinear.
The offered and preferred hours distributions are shown in Figure 11. It is striking
to see that out of all the women only between 20 and 30 percent would prefer not
to work, if they were completely free to choose. According to the estimated job offer
distribution, however, most jobs that are offered require 40 working hours per week.
If they have to choose between no job or a 40-hour job, women choose not to work.
Finally, Table XV concludes with some estimation results corresponding with
different versions of the hours restrictions model. The first three columns show the
estimation results for different values of the maximum of job offers Nmax. Comparing
the two columns corresponding with Nmas - 15 and Nmat - 33 yields no striking
differences and the values of the loglikelihoods are close. The loglikelihood value
for N,,,~ - 3 is lower than the value for Nmaz - 15 or N,,,~ - 33. Apparently, the
maximum of the likelihood function is not at Nmal - 3. It is computationally difficult
to assess which value of NmQS maximises the likelihood function. The likelihood
function keeps increasing if the value of Nma~ is increased. Unfortunately, the highest
factorial the computer is able to deal with goes with Nmar - 33. Thus, it can only be
concluded that Nmai must be large. From the results it is not possible to conclude
that the value of NmaZ that maximises the likelihood function is less than infinity.
The expected number of job offers N,,,as . pN remains for the larger values of Nmal in
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the neighbourhood of five. The job offer probabilities (p's) and p~r differ considerably
between N,,,,x - 3 and Nmaz - 15 or 33. The probability of receiving no job offers
at all (p(0)) is very small in all three cases.
Column 4 gives the estimation results using before-tax wages. Using after-tax
wages instead of before-tax wages has little influence on the estimated values of
the parameters of the offered hours distribution. The wage coefficient in the hours
equation decreases if before-tax wages are used instead of after-tax wages. Also,
the coefficients for family size and the dummy for children younger than six become
smaller. The income coefTicient in the hours equation becomes insignificant. Although
the cceflïcients of age and age squared in the wage equation differ considerably the
maximum of the wage age profile is still at about 37 years.
Most interesting is the shape of the budget constraint. Now indeed an S-shaped
budget constraint is found with an inflection point at about 19 hours suggesting
the productivity related start-up and fatigue effects. In this case, the high degree
of nonparticipation can be explained by the relatively lower wages in the low hours
range. In the model with after-tax wages, family size and the presence of children
younger than six induce individuals not to work. This can be seen from the sharp
jump in the coefficients of family size and the number of children younger than six
(see columns 3 and 4 in Table XV).
Figures 12 and 13 show the simulated, preferred and offered hours distributions.
These figures very much resemble Figures 10 and 11.
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TABLE XV: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE HOURS RE-
STRICTIONS MODEL
Hours Restrictiona and Nonlinear Budget Constraint





































2.s2 (o.8s) 2.s1 (o.8s) 2.s2 (o.so) l.oo (0.22)
-0.008 (0.003) -0.008 (0.003) -0.008 (0.003) -0.0007(0.0007)
37.6 (13.1) 38.5 (13.4) 38.? (13.5) 36.6 (8.9)
-0.88 (0.89) -0.88 (0.89) -0.88 (0.90) -0.83 (0.61)
0.005 (0.01) 0.005 (0.1) 0.005 (0.01) 0.005 (0.008)
-19.0 (5.3) -19.6 (5.5) -19.8 (5.s) -14.5 (2.9)
-13.1 (4.2) -13.5 (4.4) -13.6 (4.4) -0.90 (0.22)
13.0 (4.1) 13.3 (4.2) 13.4 (4.3) 9.8 (1.9)
-0.08 (3.7) -0.14 (3.7) -0.14 (3.7) -13.7 (s.5)
0.74 (0.18) 0.74 (0.18) 0.74 (0.18) 1.50 (0.33)
-o.ol (0.002) -o.ol (0.002) -o.ol (0.002) -0.02 (0.004)
0.08 (0.54) 0.09 (0.55) 0.09 (0.55) 0.26 (1.0)
1.89 (0.51) 1.91 (0.51) 1.91 0.51) 3.2 (0.9)
5.61 (0.77) 5.61 (0.76) 5.62 (0.76) 9.6 (1.4)
0.58 (0.25) 0.59 (0.25) 0.59 (0.25) 0.99 (0.43)
-0.08 (o.o7s) -0.08 (0.08) -0.08 (o.os) 0.17 (0.12)
-0.0004 (0.001) -0.0005 (0.001) -0.0005 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002)
3.89 (0.16) 3.89 (0.16) 3.89 (0.16) 6.9 (0.3)
-0.58 (0.13) -0.57 (0.12) -0.56 (0.12) -0.60 (0.12)
0.017 (0.009) 0.011 (0.004) 0.011 (0.004) 0.013 (0.005)
0.042 (o.olo) o.o2s (o.olo) o.oz7 (o.olo) 0.031 (o.oll)
0.020 (0.005) 0.014 (0.005) 0.013 (0.005) 0.015 (0.005)
0.064 (0.014) 0.044 (0.014) 0.042 (0.013) 0.046 (0.014)
0.044 (0.011) 0.031 (0.010) 0.030 (0.010) 0.032 (0.011)
0.312 (0.049) 0.270 (0.063) 0.264 (0.066) 0.269 (0.063)
0.106 (0.031) 0.118 (0.037) 0.119 (0.039) 0.113 (0.036)
0.065 0.087 0.090 0.085
0.932 (0.137) 0.302 (0.081) 0.147 (0.042) 0.296 (0.079)
3 5 5 9
0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
-2034.9 -2033.9 -2033.8 -2234.3
Standard Errora in Parenthesea.















Model with linear budget constraint, no hours restrictions
Sample distribution
------ Simulated distribution
--- ---------- - ---- i-4Z-a -- - ~f- ---~-
Model with nonlinear budget constraint, no hours restrictions
---- ---------- ----
---- -------- -----
~ i i r i r i r i i i r r
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number of hours
FIGURE 9: Sample and simulated hours distributions for the models without hours
restrictions.





















Model with nonlinear budget constraint and hours restrictions
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
number of hours
FIGURE 10: Sample and simulated hours distributions for the models with hours
restrictions.
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number oi hours
FIGURE 11: Preferred and offered hours distributions for the models with hours
restrictions.













0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
number of hours
FIGURE 12: Sample and simulated hours distributions for the model with hours
restrictions (Nmat - 15) and with a nonlinear budget constraint (before-tax wages).
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0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64
number of hours
FIGURE 13: Offered and preferred hours distributions for the model with hours re-
strictions (Nm62 - 15) and with a nonlinear budget constraint (before-tax wages).
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6.3 Conclusion
A full simultaneous model of labour supply and wage determination with hours re-
strictions has been estimated. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.
The hypothesis of a linear budget constcaint has to be rejected; after-tax wages ap-
pear to decrease with hours of work. More important, incorporating hours restrictions
into the standard labour supply-wage model produces a better approximation of the
actual hours distribution. The rare occurrence of females working only a few hours
per week is explained by hours constraints. One should note that this explanation is
one of the many plausible interpretations.
One of the limitations of this model is that it is static. Although it is obvious that
in the future a model of job offers should be dynamic, this model may be a natural
first step towards confronting labour supply with labour demand. Another drawback
of this study is that the hours restrictions are imposed by a distribution of job offers
common to all individuals. Further research requires a specification which accounts
for differences in employment opportunities between individuals. Furthermore, tax
laws and social secutity systems should be considered explicitly in describing the
budget constraint.
6.A Appendix
First, the exact specification of the eik's, i.e. the value of e for which utility in
hi equals utility in hk are given. Then an alternative and probably less efficient
formulation of the model is presented. Finally the entire model estimated is given,
and it is shown that the standard model is a special case of the extended model.
The values eik follow from equating utility between points hi and hk, satisfying
the budget constraint.
U(hi,yi) - U(hk,yk) (6.19)
Using equation (6.1) and substituting equation (6.5) gives:
ln(ry - Qh ) ~ ~(hi-Xb-eik-Qyi) -
' (7 - Qhi)
(6.20)
FIEN EN GUUS
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yk - hkZt(i .} bhk ~- ch~ f v f hkv
Simple calculations give the solution for e;k:
e k -(ry -
Qhi)(7 - Qhk)
ln((ry - Qhk)~(ry - Qhi)) f
' (i~(hk - hi)
(Qhi - ry)(bhk f chk) -(Qhk - ry)(bh; f ch~) }
hk-h;
-y~Q-Xb-Qv-ryZ~-ryv
- u;k - ryv (6.21)
In Moffitt (1984) the probability of observing an individual at point h- h; is derived:
h-h; iff maxe;k Ge Gmin e;k (6.22)
k~j k~j
Rule (6.22) expresses the range of values of the unobserved tastes for work e, which
will generate a choice h- h;. A higher value of e corresponds to a greater taste
for work and a lower value of e to a lower taste for work (see equation (6.2)). Thus
the rule says that the value of e has to be higher than all those values e;k equating
utility between the choice h; and lower number of working hours (hk~ G h; and has to
be lower than all those values e;k equating utility between the choice h; and higher
number of working hours (hkk 1 h;). This means that the indifference curve for




FIGURE 14: The choice h~ if maxk~~ e~k G e G mink~~ e~k
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h
of e) in point (h„y~) than those indifference curves connecting point (h„y~) with
points ( hk~, yk~) ( lower number of working hours) and needs to be steeper (i.e. lower
e) in point (h„y~) than those indifference curves connecting point (h„ y~) with points
(hkAi ykh) (higher number of working hours). This is illustrated in Figure 14.
If e is assumed to be normally distributed, rule (6.22) defines probabilities for choice
h~ if the choice set consists of all possible numbers of working hours hk, k - 0, ..., m.
But if the number of job offers is limited, so that individuals cannot freely choose
their optimal number of hours, one has to account for all possible sets of job offers
and their probability of occurring. In noting the probability of observin h~ hours,
only the sets with at least one offer h~ are relevant. There are S- ~N11 ~ m; 1 1} 1
number of these sets, to be called V~(s). Remember that N is the total nu`mber ofJjob
offers and m is the number of possible positive distinct hours. Then the probability
of observing h~ hours in the set V~(s) is the probability of occurence of the set V~(s)
times the probability that h~ is preferred to alI other numbers of hours in the set V~(s).
The likelihood of observing h- h~ hours, given v, is the sum of the probability of
observing h~ in the set V~(s) over all s:
R.L.E. v~rt 'T HUL
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s
L(h - h~~v) -~ Pr[max e~k G e C m~n e~k~hk E V;(s), v] Pr[V~ - V~(s)] (6.23)
s-1
The determination of the likelihood of observing h~ is the same as looking for the
appropriate range of values of e, for all possible sets containing the offer h- h~.
Instead of this formulation, one could also look for an appropriate set of job offers,
for all possible values of e. This is no more than changing the order of integration.
This last formulation has been employed in estimation, except for the fact that the
number of job offers here is still fixed:
L(h - h~~v) - Pr(h - h~~ C e~o, v) Pr(e C e~o~v)
m
f~Pr(h - h~ ~e~k-1 C e G e~k, v) Pr(e~k-1 G e G e~k ~v) (6.24)
k-1
f Pr(h - h~~e ~ e~,,,,v)Pr(e 1 e~,,,~v)
Remembec that
Pr(h - h~ ~e~k-1 G e C e~k, v) - R~
where
R~ - (Qi } Pi )N - QN if U(h„y(h i); e, v) 1 U(fi, y(~); e, v)
- 0 otherwise
Notice that the individual is still a utility maximising person, because the set J~ (6.8)
generating the probability Q~ only encloses job offers less preferred than the revealed




L(h - hi~v) -
For h - 0:





[~(eiifi) - ~(eii-1)~Ri(7 f 1)f
m









L(h - hm~v) -
m-1
~ {[~(emk) - ~(emk-1)~~hn(k)}~
k-1 (6.27)
[1 - ~(emm-1)~~(m)
where ~ is the cumulative normal distribution function of e conditional on v and
Ri(rest) is defined as in equation (6.10) where e takes a value larger than ei,,,.
A few remarks have to be made with respect to equations (6.25)-(6.27). First,
the values eik have to be monotonically increasing in k. This will be the case if the
budget constraint is linear, but if it is nonlinear this need not be the case. Then they
have to be sorted, before the summing in equation (6.25)-(6.27) takes place. Second,
the summation is split into two parts by the third term. The reason for this is that
R.OB VAN DER I~iEI
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ejj is not defined. The ranges ejj-1 G e G ejj and ejj c e G ejjtl are combined in
ejj-1 G e C ejjtl. The last term in equation ( 6.25) (e 1 ej,,,) takes into account the
right tail of the distribution of the unobserved e. For workers the left tail (e C ejo)
is not included in the summing because not working always belongs to the choice set
and therefore working zero hours needs to be less preferred for a worker. So by rule
(6.22) the unobserved e has to be greater than ejo.
Furthermore, in the joint hours-wage model, there is the diff'iculty that the wage
rate for nonworkers is not observed. In practice this means that the only term that
can be used to define probabilities is uok - eok -h yv (see also equation (6.21)). But
given this joint unobserved effect, one is not able to evaluate utility, as the utility
function contains the expression eak - Qhkv, and only eok ~ ryv is available. The
solution to this problem lies in the fact that it is not necessary to evaluate utility at
hk, but only a comparison with utility at h- 0 is needed, using the aforementioned
rule:
h- h; iff max ejk C e C min ejk (6.28)
kG~ k~j
Using ujk - ejk f ryv this is equivalent with
h- hj iff max ujk c e~ yv G min ujk (6.29)
kGj k~j
For nonworkers this turns into
h- 0 iff u C min uok (6.30)
k~0
From rule (6.27), it is known that if u is less than uok, then hk is less preferred than




So instead of comparing utilities to determine the set J, the value u- e f ryv is
compared with values u~.
To prove that the model without. hours restrictions is a special case of our model
if N is fixed, described in Section 6.2, it is sufficient to show that the probability of
observing h- hi is equal to one for a particular range of e, if the number of job offers
tends to infinity. The crucial expression is the probability of observing h- hi (see
equation (6.10)):
N N
Ri - (Qi } Pi ) - Qi (6.32 )
Beca.use Qi is always smaller than one, Ri tends to one, for N tending to infinity, if
Qi } pi equals one. The probability Qi f pi will only be equal to one for the workers
if e falls in a particular range. In all the other cases, Qi ~ pi will be less than one
and Ri will go to zero. Similarly, there is a range for u such that Qo ( see (6.12))
will equal one. Those particular ranges for e and u are known from equation (6.22)
and (6.30). These values for e and u, which are such that working hi hours is more
preferred to working h~ hours, dk ~ j, show up in equations ( 6.25) and (6.18):
~~(eiifi) - ~(eii-1)~Ri(J } 1)
and
~(uoi)Ra(1)
So the model with fixed N converges to the model without hours constraints in Mof6tt
(1984). If N is a random variable, it must have a degenerate limiting distribution in
infinity in order to attain an equivalent result.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Determining a poverty line, and thus identifying those who should be classified as
poor, has always faced some degree of arbitrariness. The derivation of a poverty
line from the setting of an individual maximising utility might reduce the degree
of arbitrariness. In that frame of mind, this study found its inception. The search
for an economic poverty line yielded two results. Firstly, under the assumption of
an S-shaped utility function, the solution of a standard life cycle alloca.tion problem
suggests a poverty line. Secondly, there exist specifications for utility or cost functions
that immediately provide links to a poverty line. The second result makes it possible
to include labour supply in a simple way in a poverty line model and thus captures
both the spending and earning aspects of income.
Both results have been considered in this dissertation. Chapter 4 deals with the
life cycle problem. In Chapter 5, a cost function containing subsistence expenditures
is employed for a poverty line model including a simple neoclassical labour supply
model. Chapter 2 and 3 are introductions to the empirical analyses in Chapter 4 and
5. Chapter 6 extends the neoclassical labour supply model without regard to poverty.
Empirical implementation of the life cycle approach to the derivation of a poverty
line required two empirical concepts. The first one is a specification for the S- shaped
utility function. Chapter 2 introduces the utility function employed in the empirical
analysis of the life time model: The Welfare Function of Income (WFI).
The WFI is measured through the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ). The IEQ
asks a respondent of a survey to associate income levels with six evaluative verbal
labels from `very bad' to `very good'. The sequence of labels is projected to a[0,1]-
scale under the so-called equal interval assumption, i.e. each label is assumed to
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represent an equal interval of [0,1~. The WFI is assumed to have the functional form
of a lognormal distribution. Its parameters ~ and o are estimated by fitting the
lognormal distribution function through the scatter of income levels. This fitting
procedure is called the IEQ regression.
In Chapter 2, the equal interval assumption was tested under the assumption of
lognormality of the WFI. Therefore, the quantiles corresponding to the projections of
the verbal labels were estimated jointly with the parameters of the welfare function in
the IEQ regression. Although the equal interval assumption was rejected, the result
did not seem to affect the estimation results for the parameters of the WFI's.
The measurement of the parameters of the WFI with the IEQ regression can bring
about a measurement error problem. With respect to such possible measurement error
problem, it was concluded that for ~ it can be neglected and that mainly v suffers
from it.
Furthermore in Chapter 2, truncation was observed in the IEQ regression. But
this truncation problem has been left for future research.
The second empirical concept required, is a poverty line to serve as a point of reference
for the poverty line derived from the solution of the life time allocation problem.
Therefore, Chapter 3 introduces the so-called Subjective Poverty Line (SPL).
The SPL is based on what income the respondents consider to be the minimum
they themselves need to make ends meet. The response to this so-called Minimum
Income Question (MIQ) is referred to as ym;,, and has been used as a benchmark, as
mentioned before. The SPL is operationalised by specifying a relation between y,,,;,,
and household income and other relevant household characteristics such as household
siae. The SPL is determined by the fixed point of the relation between the response
to the MIQ, ym;,,, and household income.
A crucial variable in this procedure, household income, appears to be misperceived
by households themselves. This misperception of income requires some adjustment
of the MIQ responses where household income serves as a frame of reference. In
Chapter 3, the appropiate extent of adjustment has been estimated. The estimation
results show that adjustment proportionate to the income misperception, as advo-
cated in the literature earlier by Kapteyn et al. (1988), causes an overestimation of
the Subjective Poverty Line for a one-person household and flatter equivalence scales.
The conclusion from Chapter 3 is that adjustment for misperception of income is
required in the SPL model and that an estimated adjustment is to be preferred to
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proportionate adjustment.
Chapter 4 deals with the derivation and empirical analysis of an economic poverty
line.
Employing an S-shaped utility function in a standard life time discounted utility
maximization problem, yields a solution with a positive lower bound of expenditure.
The optimal consumption path over time does not contain any level between zero
and that particular lower bound. So income should at least be equal to that lower
bound to make a non-zero consumption path possible. Thecefore, that lower bound
could be interpreted as a poverty line. And because of its accomplishment within a
setting of maximising utility, it is called an economic poverty line.
Also its empirical validity and its feasibility in the context of redistribution of
income have been considered. Using the WFI as utility fiinction and ym;,, as a point
of comparison for a poverty line did not yield empirical support for the economic
poverty line. Also the feasibility of redistribution to eliminate poverty turned out to
be restricted to income distributions with only a rather high degree of inequality.
So in Chapter 4, on the one hand, an economic poverty line has been established,
but on the other, the empirical analysis did not succeed. Future research requires
other specifications for an S-shaped utility function and~or an other point of reference
for minimum income.
Chapter 5 attempted to link minimum income y,n;n to the cost function of the Almost
Ideal Demand (AID) system. By at the same time describing labour supply with the
AID specification, the SPL model could be integrated in a labour supply model. Thus
some account was taken of the attributes of a household both as a spending and an
earning unit.
Chapter 5 started with an exogeneity test for income in the SPL regression. The
exogeneity was rejected, which induced the idea to estimate the SPL model in a
labour supply setting.
A cost function containing what could be interpreted as subsistence expenditures
is the cost function underlying the AID system. Thus the AID specification provides
a direct opportunity for including ym;,, in a labour supply model. In Chapter 5,
the SPL model was jointly estimated with the ÁID labour supply model. In the
SPL model, the downward bias in ym;,, has been remedied as in Chapter 3 and an
instrument equation was added to account for the endogeneity of income. For the
R.G.
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labour supply model, information is needed on the wage rate. This information
was only available for workers. Consequently, the total model has been estimated
for workers only. The necessary correction for sample selectivity was carried out by
treating the selected sample of workers as a truncated sample. The poverty line levels
based on the estimation results turned out to be rather low. Though one would have
expected some drop in the levels in a labour supply context, the decrease in Chapter
5 requires further research. Particularly, because throughout the whole dissertation,
the possible dynamics have been suppressed, but also because in Chapter 5 labour
supply has been modelled in a very simple, neoclassical way.
Chapter 6 extends a neoclassical labour supply model with, however, no regard to
poverty.
A neoclassical labour supply model has been fitted to the data by endogenising
wage rates and introducing restrictions from the demand side of the market in the
choice set of the individual. The addition of a wage equation made full use of the
sample (both workers and nonworkers) possible. The estimation results suggest both
a nonlinear budget constraint caused by endogenous wages and the existence of hours
restrictions. Inclusion of both features generated a simulated hours distribution much
better in line with the actual data than a standard Tobit model is able to.
Also the model in Chapter 6 has its limitations. Firstly, the model is static. Al-
though it is obvious that the modelling of job offers should be dynamic, the model in
Chapter 6 may be a natural first step towards confronting labour supply with labour
demand. Secondly, the hours restrictions were modelled as identical to all individuals.
A specification which accounts for differences in the employment opportunities be-
tween individuals is left for future research. Furthermore, tax laws and social security
systems could be considered explicitly in describing the budget constraint.
DRS. P.
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Samenvatting
Deze dissertatie is het verslag van empirisch onderzoek, dat is te splitsen in twee delen,
de hoofdstukken twee tot en met vijf en hoofdstuk zes. Het eerste deel gebruikt
antwoorden van huishoudens op inkomensattitudevragen, zogenoemde subjectieve
data, en het tweede deel gebruikt louter zogenoemde objectieve data, arbeidsaanbod-
gegevens van vrouwen uit een huishouden van minimaal twee volwassenen.
De eerstgenoemde hoofdstukken vinden hun oorsprong in hoofstuk vier. Hoofd-
stuk vier tracht een raakpunt te vinden tussen bestaanonzekerheid en economie. Er
wordt gekeken of economie hulp kan bieden bij een definitie van een bestaansonzeker-
heidsgrens ter identificatie van een huishouden dat in armoede verkeert. Bij gebruik
van een S-vormige nutsfunctie in een allocatieprobleem over de levenscyclus blijkt
er zo'n raakpunt te zijn. Het punt waar de voerstraal van en de raaklijn aan de
nutsfunctie samenvallen, geeft aanleiding tot een economische bestaansonzekerheids-
grens. Dit punt blijkt namelijk een positieve ondergrens te vormen in het optimale
consumptiepad. Om het empirisch gehalte van deze definitie te toetsen is een tweetal
concepten nodig, een specificatie voor een S-vormige nutsfunctie en een ijkpunt voor
een bestaansonzekerheidsgrens.
Hoofdstuk twee introduceert een S-vormige nutsfunctie. Dit is de `Welfare Func-
tion of Income'. Deze wordt gemeten door het stellen van de inkomensevaluatievraag.
Respondenten wordt gevraagd om zes inkomensniveau's te voegen bij een verbale zes-
puntsschaal van `zeer slecht' naar `zeer goed'. Aan de hand van een aantal veronder-
stellingen is het mogelijk een nutsfunctie te schatten van lognormale vorm. Hoofdstuk
twee bekijkt enkele veronderstellingen nader. Eén van die veronderstellingen betreft
de quantificering van de verbale schaal. Als je veronderstelt dat de respondenten de
inkomensevaluatievraag zo informatierijk als mogelijk beantwoorden, kunnen de ver-
bale labels geprojecteerd worden op de oneven twaalfden van de eenheidsschaal [0,1~.
De assumptie van optimale informatie-overdracht wordt in hoofdstuk twee getoetst
door de quantielen die met de twaalfden corresponderen tegelijkertijd te schatten
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met de nutsfunctie. Hcewel dit een verwerping van deze assumptie oplevert, blijken
de zonder deze veronderstelling geschatte nutsfuncties weinig af te wijken van de
nutsfuncties geschat met deze veronderstelling.
Hoofdstuk drie introduceert een bestaansonzekerheidsgrens, de `Subjective Poverty
Line'. Deze bestaansonzekerheidsgrens is gebaseerd op de zogenoemde minimumin-
komensvraag. Respondenten wordt gevraagd een bedrag te noemen dat net vol-
doende is om in hun situatie rond te komen. De antwoorden worden in een re-
gressiemodel gerelateerd aan het inkomen en overige relevante kenmerken van een
huishouden, zoals bijvoorbeeld de samenstelling van een huishouden. Het vastpunt
van de zo geschatte relatie tussen het minimuminkomen en het inkomen is de `Sub-
jective Poverty Line'. Het blijkt nu dat de hoofden van de huishoudens het totale
huishoudinkomen onderschatten. Deze onderschatting werkt door in de antwoorden
op de minimuminkomensvraag en vraagt derhalve om een correctie. De mate van
correctie wordt in hoofdstuk drie meegeschat in het regressiemodel. De schattingsre-
sultaten suggereren dat dit te preferen is boven het corrigeren van de antwoorden in
gelijke mate als het inkomen onderschat wordt, zoals dat voorheen gebeurde.
Hoofdstuk vier behandelt het allocatieprobleem over de levenscyclus. De oplossing
van dit probleem levert een positief minimumniveau voor consumptie op. Dit patroon
nu maakt dit minimumniveau kandidaat voor een bestaansonzekerheidsgrens. In
hoofdstuk vier wordt deze kandidatuur empirisch bezien. Hantering van de nutsfunc-
tie uit hoofdstuk twee en de antwoorden op de minimuminkomensvraag uit hoofdstuk
drie levert geen steun op voor de potentiéle bestaansonzekerheidsgrens. Ook blijkt
inkomensherverdeling zodat iedereen boven de grens komt, niet altijd mogelijk. Deze
resultaten hangen natuurlijk af van de gekozen specificatie voor de nutsfunctie en het
referentiepunt voor een bestaansonzekerheidsgrens.
Hoofdstuk vijf probeert langs een andere weg de antwoorden op de minimumin-
komensvraag te koppelen aan een nutsmaximilisatieprobleem, namelijk de afweging
tussen inkomen en vrije tijd. Hoofdstuk vijf opent met een exogeniteitstoets voor
inkomen in het regressiemodel van hoofdstuk drie. Deze toets leidt tot verwerping
van de exogeniteit van inkomen in dat model. Deze verwerping gaf aanleiding om
het model uit hoofdstuk drie te schatten in een arbeidsaanbodcontext. De kosten-
functie van het `Almost Ideal Demand System' biedt daartoe een directe gelegen-
heid. De specificatie van deze kostenfunctie bevat een term die te interpreteren is als
noodzakelijke uitgaven. Door het antwoord op de minimuminkomensvraag hieraan te
verbinden en vervolgens de resulterende specificatie te gebruiken om arbeidsaanbod
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te beschrijven ontstaat een model dat het model uit hoofdstuk drie met een arbeids-
aanbodmodel kan combineren. Deze combinatie leidt in hoofdstuk vijf tot een sterke
reductie in de bestaansonzekerheidsgrenzen, hetgeen noopt tot verder onderzoek. De
modellering van arbeidsaanbod in hoofdstuk vijf is standaard en eenvoudig. Deze
eenvoud is mogelijk door een aantal veronderstellingen, die niet altijd stroken met de
data.
Hoofdstuk zes richt de aandacht op arbeidsaanbod in het bijzonder. In dit hoofd-
stuk wordt een tweetal veronderstellingen bij een standaard arbeidsaanbodmodel los-
gelaten door de vraagkant van de arbeidsmarkt bij de arbeidsaanbodbeslissing te
betrekken. Het arbeidsaanbodmodel in hoofdstuk zes biedt de mogelijkheid dat de
loonvoet afhangt van de lengte van de werkweek. Bovendien wordt rekening gehouden
met de mogelijkheid dat een individu beperkt wordt bij zijn keuze. Niet alle uren-
aantallen zijn in gelijke mate beschikbaar en onvrijwillige werkeloosheid wordt niet
uitgesloten. Beide uitbreidingen stellen het geschatte model beter in staat de data te
simuleren. De in de data waargenomen lage participatiegraa.d is te interpreteren als
een gevolg van een discrepantie tussen gewenste en geboden urenaantallen.
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